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Abstract	  –	  According	  to	  pancomputationalism,	  all	  physical	  systems	  –	  atoms,	  rocks,	  hurricanes,	  and	  
toasters	  –	  perform	  computations.	  Pancomputationalism	  seems	  to	  be	  increasingly	  popular	  among	  some	  
philosophers	  and	  physicists.	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  interpret	  pancomputationalism	  in	  terms	  of	  computational	  
descriptions	  of	  varying	  strength—computational	  interpretations	  of	  physical	  microstates	  and	  dynamics	  
that	  vary	  in	  their	  restrictiveness.	  We	  distinguish	  several	  types	  of	  pancomputationalism	  and	  identify	  
essential	  features	  of	  the	  computational	  descriptions	  required	  to	  support	  them.	  By	  tying	  various	  
pancomputationalist	  theses	  directly	  to	  notions	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  computation	  in	  a	  physical	  system,	  we	  
clarify	  the	  meaning,	  strength,	  and	  plausibility	  of	  pancomputationalist	  claims.	  We	  show	  that	  the	  force	  of	  
these	  claims	  is	  diminished	  when	  weaknesses	  in	  their	  supporting	  computational	  descriptions	  are	  laid	  
bare.	  Specifically,	  once	  computation	  is	  meaningfully	  distinguished	  from	  ordinary	  dynamics,	  the	  most	  
sensational	  pancomputationalist	  claims	  are	  unwarranted,	  whereas	  the	  more	  modest	  claims	  offer	  little	  
more	  than	  recognition	  of	  causal	  similarities	  between	  physical	  processes	  and	  the	  most	  primitive	  
computing	  processes.	  	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	  
An	  ordinary	  rock	  implements	  every	  finite-­‐state	  automaton.	  A	  pail	  of	  water	  is,	  for	  fleeting	  moments,	  
computationally	  equivalent	  to	  a	  conscious	  human	  brain.	  The	  universe	  is	  a	  computer.	  Everything	  
computes.	  	  
Such	  claims,	  which	  are	  increasingly	  common	  in	  both	  the	  philosophical	  and	  scientific	  literature,	  are	  
closely	  related	  to	  the	  broad	  thesis	  that	  all	  physical	  systems	  perform	  computations:	  
pancomputationalism	  (PC).	  Any	  pancomputationalist	  claim	  rests	  on	  some	  notion	  of	  what	  it	  means	  for	  a	  
physical	  system	  to	  implement	  a	  computation,	  and	  may	  be	  taken	  as	  patently	  absurd,	  empirically	  
substantive,	  or	  trivially	  self-­‐evident	  depending	  on	  what	  counts	  physically	  as	  a	  computation.	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In	  this	  work	  we	  adopt	  our	  earlier	  classification	  of	  pancomputationalism	  into	  three	  generic	  types	  
(Piccinini	  2015)	  –	  unlimited	  PC,	  limited	  PC,	  and	  ontic	  PC.	  We	  then	  identify	  three	  general	  classes	  of	  
computational	  description—three	  explicit	  specifications	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  computation	  in	  physical	  
systems	  that	  vary	  in	  their	  restrictiveness—and	  characterize	  the	  various	  types	  of	  PC	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
nature	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  computational	  descriptions	  required	  to	  support	  them.	  This	  allows	  
pancomputationalist	  claims	  to	  be	  evaluated	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  they	  inherently	  say	  about	  physical	  
computation	  itself.	  
We	  set	  the	  stage	  by	  considering	  computational	  states,	  computational	  processes,	  and	  usability,	  and	  
associating	  the	  strength	  of	  a	  computational	  description	  with	  its	  commitments	  regarding	  these	  
fundamental	  notions	  (Section	  2).	  We	  then	  consider	  unlimited	  PC	  (Sec	  3(a)).	  We	  identify	  several	  variants	  
of	  unlimited	  PC	  and	  show	  that	  they	  are	  supported	  only	  by	  the	  weakest	  form	  of	  computational	  
description.	  Next,	  we	  take	  up	  limited	  PC	  (Sec.	  3(b)).	  We	  show	  that	  trivial	  forms	  of	  limited	  PC	  survive	  
when	  the	  restrictions	  on	  computational	  description	  that	  support	  unlimited	  PC	  are	  expanded	  moderately	  
–	  but	  only	  moderately	  –	  and	  argue	  that	  less	  trivial	  forms	  of	  limited	  PC	  are	  rendered	  untenable	  by	  these	  
additional	  restrictions.	  Here	  we	  address	  unique	  issues	  that	  arise	  when	  the	  would-­‐be	  computing	  system	  
is	  the	  universe	  as	  a	  whole.	  Finally,	  we	  briefly	  consider	  ontic	  PC	  (Sec.	  3(c)),	  which	  largely	  sidesteps	  the	  
requirements	  for	  computational	  description	  and	  is	  evaluated	  on	  other	  grounds	  elsewhere	  (Piccinini	  and	  
Anderson	  2017).	  	  
Five	  aspects	  of	  our	  study	  should	  be	  noted:	  	  	  
First,	  we	  avoid	  the	  common	  formulation	  of	  PC	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  everything	  is	  a	  computer.	  The	  reason	  is	  
that	  in	  both	  computer	  science	  and	  common	  parlance	  the	  term	  “computer”	  usually	  refers	  to	  computing	  
systems	  with	  special	  features	  such	  as	  programmability	  and	  computational	  universality	  (up	  to	  their	  
memory	  limitations)	  in	  Turing’s	  (1936-­‐7)	  sense.	  Many	  computing	  systems	  are	  not	  programmable	  or	  
computationally	  universal,	  so	  many	  computing	  systems	  are	  not	  computers	  in	  this	  sense.	  Instead,	  we	  
formulate	  pancomputationalism	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  everything	  performs	  computations	  or,	  equivalently,	  
everything	  is	  a	  computing	  system.	  	  	  
Second,	  in	  considering	  pancomputationalism,	  we	  accept	  that	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  a	  physical	  system	  
may	  perform	  computations	  even	  though	  it	  has	  no	  semantic	  properties	  and	  does	  not	  have	  the	  function	  to	  
compute.	  According	  to	  semantic	  accounts	  of	  computation,	  there	  is	  no	  computation	  without	  
representation;	  according	  to	  mechanistic	  accounts,	  computing	  systems	  are	  physical	  systems	  whose	  
function	  is	  to	  perform	  computations	  (Piccinini	  2015).	  Given	  these	  accounts,	  anything	  that	  is	  has	  no	  
semantic	  properties	  or	  no	  functions,	  respectively,	  is	  ruled	  out	  of	  the	  class	  of	  computing	  systems.	  So	  
pancomputationalism	  is	  false	  according	  to	  these	  accounts.	  This	  may	  be	  acceptable	  in	  other	  contexts	  but	  
is	  too	  strong	  for	  present	  purposes.	  Since	  we	  wish	  to	  entertain	  pancomputationalism	  as	  a	  serious	  
possibility	  and	  give	  it	  due	  process,	  we	  admit	  accounts	  of	  physical	  computation	  that	  do	  not	  rule	  out	  
pancomputationalism	  almost	  from	  the	  start.	  	  	  
Third,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  literal	  pancomputationalism	  –	  the	  thesis	  that	  all	  physical	  systems	  do	  perform	  
computations.	  Except	  where	  otherwise	  noted,	  we	  set	  aside	  metaphorical	  pancomputationalist	  theses	  to	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the	  effect	  that	  all	  physical	  systems	  can	  be	  regarded	  or	  interpreted	  as	  computational.	  Metaphorical	  PC	  
may	  be	  useful	  and	  may	  open	  perspectives	  that	  yield	  valuable	  insights	  in	  both	  physics	  and	  computation,	  
but	  it	  says	  something	  fundamentally	  different	  and	  much	  less	  sensational	  than	  literal	  PC.	  	  	  
Fourth,	  we	  focus	  primarily	  on	  pancomputationalism	  related	  to	  deterministic	  classical	  (as	  opposed	  to	  
quantum)	  digital	  computation	  in	  systems	  with	  at	  least	  quasi-­‐classical	  physical	  descriptions,	  as	  this	  is	  the	  
most	  common	  notion	  employed	  by	  pancomputationalists.	  Unless	  otherwise	  noted,	  for	  present	  purposes	  
we	  take	  a	  digital	  computing	  system	  to	  be	  a	  finite-­‐state	  automaton,	  described	  abstractly	  by	  countable	  
sets	  of	  computational	  states	  C,	  inputs	  I,	  transition	  rules	  (C,I)àC’	  that	  govern	  the	  automaton’s	  behavior,	  
and	  outputs	  O(C)	  (or	  O(C,I)).	  Quantum	  computation	  will	  also	  be	  discussed	  in	  connection	  with	  ontic	  PC.	  
Much	  of	  our	  analysis	  would	  also	  apply,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  to	  a	  hypothetical	  version	  of	  
pancomputationalism	  formulated	  in	  terms	  of	  classical	  analog	  computation	  (Pour-­‐El	  1974,	  Rubel	  1989,	  
Mills	  2008)	  and	  to	  probabilistic	  classical	  digital	  computation.	  
Fifth	  and	  finally,	  we	  emphasize	  that	  by	  “computational	  description	  of	  a	  physical	  system”	  we	  mean	  
ascription	  of	  would-­‐be	  computational	  states	  and	  processes	  to	  physical	  microstates	  and	  their	  dynamics,	  
taking	  the	  microphysical	  to	  be	  primary	  and	  given.	  This	  is	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  what	  might	  be	  called	  a	  
physical	  description	  of	  a	  computational	  system,	  i.e.,	  a	  description	  of	  a	  specified	  system	  or	  artifact—
deemed	  “computational”	  at	  the	  outset—that	  provides	  a	  physical	  account	  of	  the	  system’s	  presumed	  
computational	  capabilities.	  Descriptions	  of	  the	  latter	  sort,	  which	  can	  take	  highly	  sophisticated	  forms	  for	  
specific	  types	  of	  computing	  devices	  and	  are	  stock-­‐in-­‐trade	  for	  the	  engineers	  that	  create	  them,	  are	  ill	  
suited	  for	  analysis	  of	  pancomputationalism.	  Evaluation	  of	  claims	  about	  the	  inherent	  computational	  
capacities	  of	  arbitrary	  physical	  systems	  requires	  the	  former	  sort	  of	  description—a	  description	  that	  starts	  
with	  physical	  microstates	  and	  their	  dynamics	  and	  delineates	  possible	  options	  for	  their	  connection	  to	  
computational	  states	  and	  processes.	  Such	  are	  the	  descriptions	  we	  employ	  in	  this	  work,	  as	  we	  now	  
discuss	  in	  detail.	  
2.	  Computational	  Description	  
	  
What	  counts	  as	  a	  computational	  description	  of	  a	  physical	  system?	  More	  precisely,	  what	  sort	  of	  relation	  
between	  physical	  microstates	  and	  their	  dynamics,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  computational	  states,	  
computational	  processes,	  and	  interaction	  with	  users,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  renders	  physical	  systems	  
computational?	  There	  are	  many	  possible	  answers	  to	  this	  question,	  some	  compatible	  with	  particular	  
varieties	  of	  pancomputationalism	  and	  some	  incompatible	  with	  pancomputationalism	  in	  any	  form.	  In	  this	  
section	  we	  identify	  classes	  of	  possible	  computational	  descriptions,	  organized	  by	  the	  restrictiveness	  of	  
the	  commitments	  they	  require	  concerning	  the	  correspondence	  between	  the	  microphysical	  and	  the	  
computational.	  These	  classes	  of	  computational	  description	  will	  be	  used	  in	  Section	  3	  to	  analyze	  varieties	  




2(a).	  	  Elements	  of	  Computational	  Description	  
	  
We	  begin	  by	  discussing	  elements	  of	  computational	  description	  and	  identifying	  possible	  commitments	  
that	  one	  might	  make	  regarding	  their	  correspondence	  with	  microphysical	  description.	  	  
Computational	  States	  
In	  principle	  and	  in	  practice,	  there	  is	  a	  natural	  correspondence	  between	  physical	  microstates	  and	  
computational	  states.	  The	  simplest	  possible	  correspondence	  would	  be	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  mapping	  between	  
the	  physical	  microstates	  of	  a	  system	  and	  its	  computational	  states.	  But	  ordinary	  computational	  
descriptions	  posit	  countably	  many	  computational	  states,	  while	  ordinary	  (continuous)	  microphysical	  
descriptions	  posit	  uncountably	  many	  states.	  Therefore,	  ordinarily	  there	  aren’t	  enough	  computational	  
states	  for	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  mapping	  with	  physical	  microstates.	  Alternatively,	  one	  can	  select	  a	  countable	  
subset	  of	  the	  physical	  microstates	  and	  map	  the	  computational	  states	  onto	  them.	  More	  realistically,	  
computational	  states	  are	  taken	  to	  correspond	  to	  disjunctions	  of	  physical	  microstates,	  regions	  of	  the	  
physical	  system’s	  state	  space	  (each	  containing	  an	  uncountably	  infinite	  number	  of	  microstates),	  or	  –	  most	  
generally	  –	  disjunctions	  of	  these	  state-­‐space	  regions.	  With	  this,	  a	  minimal	  commitment	  regarding	  
physical-­‐computational	  state	  correspondence	  is	  the	  following:	  
S:	  	  	   Every	  computational	  state	  corresponds	  to	  a	  distinct	  physical	  microstate	  of	  a	  system,	  a	  
disjunction	  of	  physical	  microstates,	  a	  region	  of	  the	  system’s	  state	  space,	  or	  a	  disjunction	  of	  
non-­‐overlapping	  state-­‐space	  regions.	  
Note	  that,	  in	  whichever	  manner	  S	  is	  satisfied,	  no	  physical	  microstate	  can	  be	  shared	  by	  more	  than	  one	  
computational	  state	  if	  all	  computational	  states	  are	  to	  be	  perfectly	  distinguishable	  from	  one	  another,	  and	  
we	  will	  take	  this	  to	  be	  implicit	  in	  S.	  Note	  also	  that	  many	  physical	  microstates	  may	  go	  without	  any	  
computational	  state	  assignment	  at	  all.	  This	  is	  natural	  and	  common	  in	  ordinary	  computing	  systems;	  the	  
microstates	  accessed	  by	  a	  system	  during	  transitions	  between	  computational	  states,	  for	  example,	  may	  
not	  themselves	  be	  associated	  with	  any	  computational	  state.	  The	  physical	  state	  of	  a	  system	  need	  only	  
correspond	  to	  a	  computational	  state	  during	  time	  intervals	  deemed	  to	  be	  “computationally	  relevant	  
times.”	  
We	  emphasize	  that,	  by	  condition	  S	  alone,	  a	  physical	  microstate	  may	  encode	  much	  more	  than	  the	  
computational	  state	  with	  which	  it	  is	  associated.	  Given	  knowledge	  of	  a	  system’s	  dynamics,	  or,	  
alternatively,	  a	  complete	  record	  of	  the	  sequence	  of	  microstates	  visited	  by	  a	  system	  with	  unknown	  
dynamics,	  specification	  of	  the	  system’s	  microstate	  may	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  predecessor	  microstates.	  This	  
has	  nontrivial	  implications	  for	  computational	  descriptions	  that	  require	  nothing	  more	  than	  S	  when	  
associating	  physical	  states	  with	  computational	  states.	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  suppose	  that	  at	  time	  t	  the	  
physical	  microstates	  P(t)	  and	  Q(t)	  lie	  in	  the	  region	  of	  the	  state	  space	  corresponding	  to	  a	  given	  
computational	  state	  C.	  Suppose	  also	  that	  P(t)	  and	  Q(t)	  are	  known	  to	  have	  evolved	  from	  –	  or	  to	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necessarily	  evolve	  from	  –	  microstates	  P(t-­‐1)	  and	  Q(t-­‐1),	  respectively,	  and	  that	  P(t-­‐1)	  and	  Q(t-­‐1)	  lie	  in	  
regions	  of	  the	  system’s	  state	  space	  that	  correspond	  to	  different	  computational	  states	  C’A	  and	  C’B.	  
Specification	  of	  the	  system’s	  physical	  microstate	  at	  time	  t	  as	  P(t)	  implies	  not	  only	  that	  the	  system	  is	  in	  
computational	  state	  C	  at	  time	  t,	  but	  also	  that	  it	  was	  in	  computational	  state	  C’A	  (and	  not	  C’B)	  at	  time	  t-­‐1.	  
In	  a	  computational	  description,	  however,	  specification	  of	  a	  system’s	  computational	  state	  as	  C	  at	  time	  t	  
would	  imply	  that	  the	  system	  could	  have	  been	  in	  either	  C’A	  or	  C’B	  at	  t-­‐1	  but	  would	  not	  identify	  the	  
predecessor	  as	  CA’.	  	  
This	  implicit	  disjoining	  of	  physical	  microstates	  and	  their	  predecessor	  states	  into	  physical	  realizations	  of	  
static	  computational	  states	  goes	  beyond	  a	  simple	  correspondence	  between	  computational	  states	  and	  
physical	  states,	  and	  is	  not	  prevented	  by	  S	  alone.	  	  A	  physical	  microstate	  taken	  (via	  S)	  to	  correspond	  to	  a	  
given	  computational	  state	  may,,	  under	  some	  dynamics,	  actually	  correspond	  to	  a	  computational	  state	  
together	  with	  its	  predecessor	  physical	  microstate.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  a	  physical	  microstate	  can	  encode	  both	  
a	  computational	  state	  and	  its	  computational	  predecessor	  state,	  even	  when	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  
possible	  computational	  predecessor	  state.	  	  
The	  admissibility	  of	  such	  representationally	  unfaithful	  mappings2	  –	  mappings	  that	  allow	  excess	  
information	  about	  the	  history	  of	  a	  computational	  state	  to	  be	  encoded	  in	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  structure	  of	  its	  
physical	  representation	  –	  has	  nontrivial	  consequences	  for	  implementation.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  a	  requirement	  for	  faithful	  representation,	  there	  is	  no	  objective	  basis	  for	  distinguishing	  an	  evolution	  of	  
a	  physical	  system	  that	  maps	  each	  of	  M	  computational	  states	  onto	  itself	  (i.e.,	  it	  does	  nothing	  
computationally)	  from	  an	  evolution	  that	  maps	  M	  computational	  states	  into	  N	  computational	  states	  with	  
N<M	  (i.e.,	  implements	  a	  logically	  irreversible	  transformation).	  The	  dissipative	  cost	  associated	  with	  
physical	  implementation	  of	  logically	  irreversible	  transformations,	  reflected	  in	  Landauer’s	  Principle	  
(Landauer	  1961,	  Bennett	  2003),	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  physical	  cost	  of	  generating	  	  
representationally	  faithful	  output	  states	  in	  such	  implementations	  (see	  Anderson	  2010).	  
Thus,	  in	  constructing	  a	  computational	  description	  of	  a	  physical	  system,	  one	  may	  reasonably	  go	  beyond	  a	  
simple	  correspondence	  between	  computational	  states	  and	  collections	  of	  a	  system’s	  microstates	  (i.e.,	  S)	  
and	  also	  insist	  that	  nothing	  about	  the	  computational	  history	  –	  about	  the	  sequence	  of	  predecessor	  
computational	  states	  (including	  the	  initial	  state)	  –	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  any	  physical	  microstate	  that	  
cannot	  also	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  computational	  state	  to	  which	  this	  physical	  microstate	  belongs.	  
Supplementing	  S	  with	  such	  a	  requirement	  –	  a	  requirement	  that	  computational	  states	  have	  faithful	  
physical	  realizers	  –	  yields	  a	  much	  stronger	  commitment	  concerning	  physical-­‐computational	  state	  
correspondence:	  
S’:	  	  	  Every	  computational	  state	  corresponds	  to	  a	  distinct	  physical	  microstate	  of	  a	  system	  or	  to	  a	  
statistical	  state	  defined	  on	  a	  disjunction	  of	  physical	  microstates,	  on	  a	  region	  of	  the	  system’s	  
state	  space,	  or	  on	  a	  disjunction	  of	  non-­‐overlapping	  state-­‐space	  regions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  notion	  of	  faithful	  representation	  was	  discussed	  by	  (Ladyman	  2007)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  classical	  thermodynamic	  
systems	  that	  implement	  logical	  transformations	  (classical	  L-­‐machines).	  	  	  This	  notion	  was	  generalized	  and	  
formalized,	  and	  a	  quantitative	  faithfulness	  measure	  introduced,	  for	  generally	  noisy,	  generally	  quantum-­‐mechanical	  
L-­‐machines	  in	  (Anderson	  2010).	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Critically,	  by	  "statistical	  state"	  we	  mean	  an	  assignment	  of	  a	  probability	  p(s,C)—at	  computationally	  
relevant	  times—	  to	  each	  microstate	  s	  associated	  with	  the	  computational	  state	  C,	  with	  no	  conditioning	  
on	  predecessor	  computational	  states	  or	  the	  microstates	  that	  belong	  to	  them.3	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  all	  
transitions	  into	  computational	  state	  C	  ultimately	  “land	  in”	  physical	  microstate	  s	  with	  probability	  p(s,C)	  
regardless	  of	  their	  source	  microstate,	  and	  that	  all	  transitions	  out	  of	  computational	  state	  C	  “depart	  from”	  
microstate	  s	  with	  probability	  p(s,C)	  regardless	  of	  their	  destination	  microstate.	  Stated	  more	  formally,	  if	  
computational	  state	  C	  evolved	  from	  predecessor	  computational	  state	  C',	  then	  (i)	  every	  microstate	  s	  in	  C	  
evolved	  from	  microstate	  s'	  in	  C'	  with	  probability	  p(s',C')	  and	  (ii)	  every	  microstate	  s'	  in	  C'	  evolves	  to	  
microstate	  s	  in	  C	  with	  probability	  p(s,C).	  Similarly,	  if	  computational	  state	  C	  evolves	  to	  successor	  
computational	  state	  C'',	  then	  (i)	  every	  microstate	  s''	  in	  C''	  will	  evolve	  from	  every	  microstate	  s	  in	  C	  with	  
probability	  p(s'',	  C'')	  and	  (ii)	  every	  microstate	  s	  in	  C	  will	  evolve	  to	  microstate	  s''	  in	  C''	  with	  probability	  
p(s,C).4	  
If	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  are	  such	  that	  this	  condition	  cannot	  be	  met	  for	  a	  given	  mapping	  onto	  
a	  computational	  description,	  at	  least	  at	  or	  during	  time	  intervals	  for	  which	  the	  computational	  states	  are	  
defined	  (i.e.,	  at	  “computationally	  relevant”	  times),	  then	  commitment	  to	  S’	  would	  require	  rejection	  of	  
such	  a	  mapping.	  If	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  are	  such	  that	  this	  condition	  cannot	  be	  met	  for	  any	  
nontrivial	  mapping	  –	  i.e.,	  any	  mapping	  that	  disjoins	  multiple	  physical	  microstates	  into	  computational	  
states	  –	  then	  commitment	  to	  S’	  rules	  out	  any	  such	  mapping.	  
A	  few	  remarks	  are	  in	  order	  regarding	  S’.	  First,	  it	  may	  appear	  that	  S’,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  about	  
computational	  states,	  is	  about	  both	  computational	  states	  and	  computational	  processes	  since	  it	  implicitly	  
requires	  that	  the	  dynamics	  randomize	  microstates	  “within”	  the	  state	  subspaces	  belonging	  to	  the	  various	  
computational	  states.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  this	  condition	  that	  selects	  only	  microphysical-­‐to-­‐
computational	  state	  mappings	  for	  which	  physical	  microstates	  encode	  nothing	  more	  than	  computational	  
states.	  It	  precludes	  association	  of	  a	  physical	  microstate	  with	  a	  computational	  state	  if	  the	  microstate	  
encodes	  information	  about	  the	  system’s	  dynamical	  history	  that	  is	  more	  finely	  grained	  than	  that	  available	  
from	  an	  abstract	  computational	  description	  (i.e.	  description	  of	  the	  system’s	  dynamics	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  
computational	  states	  alone).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  a	  quantum-­‐physical	  description	  of	  these	  computational	  states,	  the	  role	  of	  p(s,C)	  is	  played	  by	  a	  density	  operator	  
or	  density	  matrix—specifically	  a	  reduced	  density	  operator	  or	  density	  matrix	  if	  the	  system	  is	  not	  isolated	  from	  its	  
environment.	  	  	  
4	  Here	  the	  introduction	  of	  probabilistic	  state	  descriptions	  recognizes	  that	  physical	  systems	  generally	  interact	  
uncontrollably	  with	  their	  surrounding	  environments,	  and	  that	  such	  system-­‐environment	  interactions	  result	  in	  
system	  dynamics	  that	  are	  partially	  nondeterminisitic.	  This	  applies	  to	  most	  systems	  considered	  by	  
pancomputationalists	  (e.g.,	  rocks	  and	  pails	  of	  water),	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  universe	  as	  a	  whole	  (discussed	  in	  
Sec.	  3(b)).	  Randomness	  in	  dynamical	  evolution	  necessitates	  statistical	  description	  of	  states	  that	  evolve	  from	  a	  
specified	  initial	  state	  or	  from	  initial	  states	  within	  a	  specified	  state	  subspace.	  Microstate-­‐level	  physical	  descriptions	  
of	  computational	  states	  for	  systems	  that	  interact	  with	  environments	  are	  thus	  necessarily	  statistical,	  even	  when	  
transitions	  between	  the	  computational	  states	  are	  deterministic	  (see	  text).	  Statistical	  state	  description	  does	  no	  
violence	  to	  systems	  that	  are	  isolated	  from	  their	  environments	  and	  thus	  evolve	  deterministically,	  since	  
deterministic	  evolution	  is	  a	  special	  case	  of	  stochastic	  evolution	  where	  the	  probability	  is	  unity	  for	  single	  dynamical	  
microstate	  trajectory	  and	  vanishes	  for	  all	  other	  trajectories.	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Second,	  note	  that	  the	  probabilistic	  nature	  of	  S’	  does	  not	  in	  any	  way	  preclude	  its	  application	  to	  
deterministic	  computation.	  S’	  generalizes	  S	  to	  allow	  for	  microscopically	  stochastic	  processes	  that	  
randomize	  (i)	  the	  physical	  microstates	  within	  the	  region	  of	  a	  system’s	  state	  space	  that	  corresponds	  to	  a	  
given	  computational	  state	  and/or	  (ii)	  the	  physical	  microstate-­‐to-­‐microstate	  transitions	  that	  enable	  
computational	  state	  transitions	  by	  bridging	  the	  state-­‐space	  regions	  corresponding	  to	  computational	  
states	  and	  their	  deterministically	  specified	  successors.	  Such	  randomizing	  processes,	  which	  can	  occur	  
only	  in	  systems	  interacting	  with	  an	  environment,	  are	  required	  for	  computational	  states	  corresponding	  to	  
more	  than	  one	  physical	  microstate	  to	  “forget”	  enough	  about	  their	  detailed	  dynamical	  history	  to	  have	  
faithful	  microphysical	  realizers.	  These	  processes	  are	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  standard	  notions	  of	  
computational	  state	  realization	  for	  conventional	  computing	  devices.	  In	  the	  registers	  used	  in	  
deterministic	  digital	  computers,	  for	  example,	  where	  the	  register	  state	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  coarse-­‐grained	  
spatial	  distribution	  of	  charge	  density,	  nothing	  in	  the	  microstate	  of	  the	  system	  of	  charged	  particles—the	  
detailed	  roster	  of	  all	  electron	  positions	  and	  velocities	  in	  the	  register	  system—is	  presumed	  to	  encode	  
anything	  more	  than	  the	  register	  state	  at	  times	  that	  the	  register	  state	  is	  considered	  “valid”	  (i.e.,	  at	  
computationally	  relevant	  times).	  
Third,	  we	  note	  that,	  in	  typical	  computing	  systems,	  the	  microphysical	  state	  space	  corresponding	  to	  any	  
given	  computational	  state	  is	  vast,	  and	  it	  is	  entirely	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that,	  throughout	  the	  entire	  life	  
of	  the	  system,	  (i)	  no	  microstate	  belonging	  to	  any	  computational	  state	  will	  be	  visited	  more	  than	  once,	  
and	  (ii)	  an	  exceedingly	  small	  fraction	  of	  the	  microstates	  corresponding	  to	  this	  computational	  state	  will	  
ever	  be	  visited.	  Thus,	  for	  macroscopic	  physical	  computing	  systems,	  it	  is	  not	  plausible	  that	  satisfaction	  of	  
S'	  could	  be	  empirically	  confirmed	  from	  a	  record	  of	  its	  dynamical	  history	  even	  if	  the	  microstate's	  
trajectory	  through	  the	  state	  space	  could	  be	  precisely	  tracked.	  This	  precludes	  the	  possibility,	  even	  in	  
principle,	  of	  building	  "sufficient	  statistics"	  for	  empirical	  confirmation	  of	  S';	  acceptance	  of	  S'	  for	  a	  given	  
system	  thus	  relies	  on	  acceptance	  that	  physical	  laws	  are	  such	  that	  it	  will	  be	  satisfied	  –	  at	  least	  to	  a	  
sufficiently	  good	  approximation	  –	  under	  operating	  conditions	  of	  interest.	  Nothing	  that	  follows	  relies	  on	  
direct	  empirical	  confirmation	  of	  S',	  despite	  the	  necessity	  of	  S'	  for	  establishing	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  
correspondence	  between	  computational	  states	  and	  (generally	  statistical)	  physical	  states.	  It	  is	  equally	  
important,	  particularly	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  unlimited	  pancomputationalism	  in	  Sec.	  3(a),	  that	  nothing	  in	  
S’	  precludes	  any	  given	  microstate	  from	  being	  revisited	  when	  the	  computational	  state	  to	  which	  it	  belongs	  
is	  revisited	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  computation.	  	  By	  S’,	  when	  any	  given	  computational	  state	  is	  visited	  more	  
than	  once,	  any	  given	  microstate	  belonging	  to	  that	  computational	  state	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  revisited.	  
Fourth,	  note	  that	  S’	  could	  be	  satisfied	  by	  systems	  with	  completely	  random	  dynamics,	  in	  which	  every	  
physical	  microstate	  evolves	  from	  every	  other	  microstate	  with	  equal	  probability,	  if	  we	  allow	  for	  
computational	  descriptions	  with	  probabilistic	  state	  transitions.	  Even	  though	  our	  concern	  is	  deterministic	  
machines,	  this	  observation	  is	  a	  red	  flag	  that	  motivates	  the	  additional	  restrictions	  on	  computational	  
descriptions	  discussed	  below.	  
Computational	  Processes	  
If	  physical	  microstates	  are	  associated	  with	  computational	  states,	  then	  transitions	  between	  
computational	  states	  naturally	  require	  time	  evolution	  of	  physical	  microstates.	  In	  a	  computational	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description	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  that	  involves	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  computational	  states,	  each	  associated	  
with	  a	  region	  of	  the	  system’s	  physical	  state	  space,	  transitions	  between	  different	  computational	  states	  
are	  specifically	  associated	  with	  families	  of	  physical	  microstate	  transformations	  that	  evolve	  microstates	  
belonging	  to	  one	  computational	  state	  into	  microstates	  belonging	  to	  another.	  A	  minimal	  commitment	  
regarding	  the	  correspondence	  between	  physical	  and	  computational	  processes	  is	  this:	  
P:	  	  	   Every	  computational	  state	  transition	  corresponds	  to	  one	  or	  more	  time	  evolutions	  of	  a	  
system’s	  physical	  microstate	  along	  physically	  possible	  state-­‐space	  trajectories,	  possibly	  
restricted	  to	  specific	  time	  intervals.	  
Here,	  by	  a	  “physically	  possible	  state-­‐space	  trajectory”,	  we	  mean	  a	  state-­‐space	  trajectory	  that	  is	  lawfully	  
consistent	  with	  the	  system’s	  dynamics	  and	  the	  external	  influences	  (applied	  and/or	  environmental)	  that	  
act	  on	  the	  system.	  The	  temporal	  restriction	  allows	  computational	  processes	  to	  be	  defined	  only	  over	  time	  
intervals	  that	  bridge	  the	  “computationally	  relevant”	  time	  intervals	  over	  which	  computational	  states	  are	  
defined.	  
Note	  that,	  by	  P	  alone,	  the	  evolution	  of	  any	  physical	  system	  that	  takes	  its	  physical	  microstates	  along	  a	  
trajectory	  passing	  through	  microstates	  or	  state	  space	  regions	  that	  have	  been	  assigned	  to	  computational	  
states	  would	  qualify	  as	  a	  computational	  process,	  since	  any	  such	  trajectory	  necessarily	  corresponds	  to	  
some	  sequence	  of	  computational	  states.	  Consider	  a	  leaf	  falling	  from	  a	  tree.	  Different	  positions	  of	  the	  
leaf	  may	  be	  mapped	  onto	  different	  computational	  states	  and,	  by	  P	  alone,	  the	  leaf	  would	  generate	  a	  
succession	  of	  computational	  state	  transitions	  simply	  by	  floating	  to	  the	  ground.	  
An	  obvious	  and	  reasonable	  objection	  is	  that	  P	  cannot	  capture	  important	  features	  of	  computational	  
processes,	  such	  as	  the	  conditional	  dependence	  of	  computational	  state	  transitions	  and	  outputs	  on	  
computational	  inputs	  and	  previous	  computational	  states.	  Philosophers	  have	  gone	  to	  surprising	  lengths	  
in	  trying	  to	  accommodate	  these	  features,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  observational	  consequences	  of	  these	  features,	  
within	  computational	  descriptions	  that	  require	  only	  P	  in	  relating	  the	  dynamics	  of	  physical	  systems	  to	  
computational	  processes	  (cf.	  Putnam	  1988,	  Chalmers	  1996;	  more	  on	  this	  below).	  The	  resulting	  
computational	  descriptions	  are	  not,	  however,	  counterfactually	  robust	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  
capture	  the	  kind	  of	  causal	  structure	  that	  characterizes	  bona	  fide	  computational	  processes.	  In	  our	  falling-­‐
leaf	  example,	  whether	  the	  leaf	  ends	  up	  at	  a	  certain	  location	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  where	  it	  was	  before	  
(its	  previous	  “computational”	  state),	  but	  also	  on	  how	  it	  is	  oriented	  and	  how	  its	  shape	  interacts	  with	  the	  
random	  wind	  currents	  that	  blow	  it	  about.	  There	  is	  no	  way	  to	  determine	  a	  priori	  where	  the	  leaf	  would	  go	  
from	  a	  certain	  position	  (its	  “computational”	  state	  transition)	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  position,	  velocity,	  
and	  orientation	  (its	  “computational”	  state).	  
Thus,	  in	  constructing	  a	  computational	  description	  of	  a	  physical	  system,	  one	  may	  reasonably	  require	  that	  
one	  go	  beyond	  a	  simple	  correspondence	  between	  computational	  state	  transitions	  and	  physical	  
microstate	  transitions	  (i.e.,	  P)	  and	  also	  require	  that	  computational	  state	  transitions	  correspond	  to	  
physical	  state	  transitions	  that	  are	  causal	  and	  counterfactual-­‐supporting	  and,	  if	  the	  system	  receives	  
inputs,	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  inputs	  in	  the	  right	  way.	  By	  “inputs”	  we	  mean	  external	  influences	  on	  the	  
system	  that	  conditionally	  alter	  its	  internal	  dynamics	  to	  produce	  computational	  state	  transitions,	  and	  we	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will	  similarly	  define	  “outputs”	  as	  influences	  the	  system	  exerts	  on	  the	  outside	  world	  that	  depend	  
exclusively	  on	  the	  system’s	  computational	  state	  or	  on	  transitions	  the	  system	  undergoes	  between	  
computational	  states.	  These	  definitions	  of	  inputs	  and	  outputs,	  while	  very	  general,	  are	  sufficient	  for	  
present	  purposes;	  they	  will	  be	  expanded	  upon	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  
Now,	  supplementing	  P	  with	  such	  requirements	  on	  state	  transitions	  yields	  a	  much	  stronger	  commitment	  
concerning	  physical-­‐computational	  process	  correspondence:	  	  
P’:	  	  	  Every	  computational	  state	  transition	  corresponds	  to	  one	  or	  more	  time	  evolutions	  of	  a	  
system’s	  physical	  microstate	  along	  physically	  possible	  state-­‐space	  trajectories,	  possibly	  
restricted	  to	  specific	  time	  intervals,	  such	  that	  during	  the	  relevant	  time	  intervals	  each	  
physical	  microstate	  that	  corresponds	  to	  a	  given	  computational	  state	  evolves	  from	  (into)	  a	  
microstate	  that	  corresponds	  to	  its	  predecessor	  (successor)	  computational	  state	  as	  specified	  
by	  a	  set	  {(C,I)àC’}	  of	  deterministic	  state	  transition	  rules.	  
If	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  are	  such	  that	  –	  for	  a	  given	  mapping	  from	  physical	  microstates	  to	  
computational	  states	  –	  there	  exist	  no	  nontrivial	  sets	  {(C,I)àC’}	  of	  state	  transition	  rules	  for	  which	  this	  
condition	  is	  satisfied,	  then	  commitment	  to	  P’	  requires	  rejection	  of	  such	  a	  mapping.	  If	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  
physical	  system	  are	  such	  that	  this	  condition	  cannot	  be	  met	  for	  any	  such	  mapping	  for	  any	  nontrivial	  set	  of	  
state	  transition	  rules,	  then	  commitment	  to	  P’	  is	  untenable	  and	  possible	  computational	  descriptions	  of	  
the	  system	  are	  limited	  to	  those	  sufficiently	  weak	  to	  require	  nothing	  more	  restrictive	  than	  P.	  
A	  few	  remarks	  concerning	  P’.	  First,	  we	  saw	  that	  S’	  adds	  to	  S	  that	  the	  microstates	  contain	  no	  more	  
information	  about	  the	  system’s	  computational	  history	  –	  i.e.,	  predecessor	  computational	  states	  and	  
inputs	  specified	  by	  {(C,I)àC’}	  	  –	  than	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  computational	  states	  themselves.	  P’	  adds	  the	  
further	  restriction	  that	  the	  microstates	  contain	  at	  least	  as	  much	  information	  about	  the	  system’s	  
computational	  history	  as	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  computational	  states.	  We	  say	  that	  computational	  
descriptions	  satisfying	  this	  condition	  exhibit	  perfect	  computational	  fidelity.5	  State	  transition	  rules	  in	  such	  
descriptions	  are	  necessarily	  deterministic	  at	  the	  level	  of	  computational	  states	  but	  need	  not	  be	  at	  the	  
level	  of	  physical	  microstates.	  
Second,	  note	  that	  S’	  and	  P’	  jointly	  ensure	  that	  the	  computational	  description	  and	  the	  microphysical	  
description	  contain	  exactly	  the	  same	  information	  about	  the	  computational	  process	  {(C,I)àC’}.	  This	  is	  
equivalent	  to	  saying	  that	  the	  computational	  description	  captures	  an	  objective	  aspect	  of	  the	  system’s	  
causal	  structure—the	  physical	  microstates	  that	  correspond	  to	  each	  computational	  state	  all	  share	  causal	  
powers	  whose	  effects	  are	  captured	  by	  the	  computational	  description.	  We	  call	  this	  condition	  robustness.6	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Like	  the	  representational	  faithfulness,	  a	  quantitative	  measure	  for	  the	  computational	  fidelity	  has	  been	  defined	  for	  
physical	  implementation	  of	  classical	  logical	  transformations	  in	  generally	  noisy,	  generally	  quantum	  mechanical	  
systems	  (quantum	  L-­‐machines)	  in	  (Anderson	  2010);	  both	  measures	  are	  unity	  for	  systems	  with	  computational	  
descriptions	  that	  satisfy	  S’	  and	  P’.	  	  
6	  Robustness	  comes	  at	  a	  dissipative	  physical	  cost,	  which	  is	  lower	  bounded	  for	  physical	  systems	  that	  implement	  
logical	  transformations—robust	  and	  otherwise—in	  (Anderson	  2010)	  and	  for	  robust	  physical	  FSA	  in	  (Ganesh	  2013).	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Robust	  descriptions	  support	  all	  and	  only	  the	  counterfactuals	  captured	  by	  the	  computational	  description,	  
whereas	  non-­‐robust	  descriptions	  fail	  to	  support	  such	  counterfactuals.	  For	  example,	  consider	  a	  system	  in	  
physical	  microstate	  s,	  corresponding	  to	  computational	  state	  C,	  which	  evolves	  from	  predecessor	  state	  C’	  
into	  successor	  state	  C’’.	  S’	  (faithfulness)	  guarantees	  that	  all	  computationally	  relevant	  microstates	  of	  the	  
system	  encode	  no	  more	  information	  about	  the	  system’s	  dynamical	  history	  than	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  
computational	  state	  transition	  rules;	  P’	  (fidelity)	  guarantees	  that	  they	  encode	  all	  such	  information.	  
Therefore,	  if	  the	  system	  had	  been	  in	  any	  other	  arbitrary	  state	  s’	  corresponding	  to	  computational	  state	  
C’’’	  (possibly	  identical	  to	  C),	  a	  robust	  description	  guarantees	  that	  it	  would	  have	  evolved	  from	  the	  
computational	  state	  that	  precedes	  C’’’	  and	  would	  have	  evolved	  into	  the	  computational	  state	  that	  
succeeds	  C’’’.	  If	  P’	  (fidelity)	  is	  not	  satisfied,	  the	  right	  counterfactuals	  may	  not	  be	  satisfied;	  if	  the	  system	  
had	  been	  in	  s’,	  it	  may	  have	  evolved	  from	  (evolve	  into)	  any	  arbitrary	  computational	  state.	  If	  S’	  
(faithfulness)	  is	  not	  satisfied,	  the	  wrong	  counterfactuals	  may	  be	  satisfied;	  if	  the	  system	  had	  been	  in	  s’	  
where	  s’	  also	  corresponds	  to	  C	  (as	  s	  does),	  it	  may	  be	  guaranteed	  to	  have	  evolved	  from	  a	  specific	  
computational	  state	  C’’’’	  distinct	  from	  C’,	  even	  though	  nothing	  in	  the	  computational	  state	  transitions	  
distinguishes	  between	  s	  and	  s’	  in	  this	  way.	  This	  shows	  that	  S’	  and	  P’	  jointly	  ensure	  that	  a	  computational	  
description	  captures	  an	  objective	  aspect	  of	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  in	  a	  counterfactual-­‐
supporting	  way.	  
Usability	  
In	  attempting	  to	  single	  out	  physical	  systems	  that	  are	  truly	  computational,	  one	  may	  regard	  criteria	  tying	  
computational	  states	  and	  processes	  to	  their	  physical	  counterparts	  as	  insufficient	  and	  also	  require	  that	  a	  
system	  be	  usable	  for	  computation	  by	  an	  agent	  (cf.	  Piccinini	  2015,	  Hughes	  2009,	  Houkes	  &	  Vermaas	  
2010,	  Anderson	  2016a).	  Specifically,	  one	  may	  require	  a	  use	  plan	  that	  would	  enable	  an	  agent	  to	  use	  the	  
system	  to	  evaluate	  a	  function	  (or	  functions)	  for	  arguments	  of	  the	  agent’s	  choosing.	  Note	  that	  such	  a	  
requirement	  does	  not	  preclude	  consideration	  of	  natural	  systems	  as	  computational	  systems,	  since	  use	  
plans	  may	  exist	  for	  harnessing	  computational	  capacities	  of	  natural	  systems	  appropriated	  for	  
computational	  purposes	  as	  well	  as	  human-­‐made	  computing	  machines.7	  
A	  use	  plan,	  among	  other	  things,	  must	  specify	  the	  actions	  an	  agent	  would	  have	  to	  take	  to	  enter	  
computational	  inputs	  for	  evaluation	  of	  a	  specified	  function,	  commence	  the	  computational	  process	  (if	  it	  
does	  not	  occur	  spontaneously),	  and	  read	  the	  resulting	  computational	  outputs.	  This	  implies	  specification	  
of	  physical	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  computational	  inputs	  and	  outputs,	  as	  well	  as	  
user	  accessibility	  to	  these	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  so	  the	  required	  input	  states	  can	  be	  prepared	  and	  
appropriate	  measurements	  can	  be	  selected	  to	  read	  output	  states.	  It	  also	  implies	  ex	  ante	  assignment	  of	  
all	  computational	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  to	  specified	  physical	  system	  (or	  subsystem)	  states	  (or	  state-­‐space	  
regions)	  and/or	  user-­‐system	  interactions	  required	  to	  prepare	  and	  ascertain	  these	  states.	  	  	  
With	  these	  considerations	  in	  mind,	  we	  may	  formulate	  a	  commitment	  on	  usability:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Nevertheless,	  the	  existence	  of	  agents	  using	  a	  natural	  system	  according	  to	  use	  plan	  turns	  the	  system	  into	  
something	  that	  has	  functions	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  biological	  systems	  and	  ordinary	  artifacts	  have	  functions.	  Thus,	  a	  
natural	  system	  with	  a	  use	  plan	  satisfied	  the	  mechanistic	  account	  of	  computation	  (Piccinini	  2015).	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U:	  	  	  A	  usable	  computing	  system	  is	  a	  physical	  system	  that	  (a)	  supports	  computational	  processes	  
on	  computational	  states,	  and	  (b)	  for	  which	  there	  exist	  use	  plans	  that	  would	  enable	  an	  agent	  
to	  use	  the	  system	  to	  evaluate	  a	  function	  or	  functions	  for	  arguments	  of	  their	  choosing.	  	  
Note	  that	  acceptance	  of	  S	  (or	  S’)	  and	  P	  (or	  P’)	  is	  implicit	  in	  U.	  	  Elsewhere	  (Anderson	  2016b),	  we	  have	  
called	  systems	  that	  satisfy	  (a)	  protocomputing	  systems	  and	  systems	  that	  satisfy	  both	  (a)	  and	  (b)	  
computing	  artifacts.	  
	  
2(b).	  Classes	  of	  Computational	  Description	  
	  
We	  now	  identify	  and	  discuss	  three	  broad	  classes	  of	  computational	  description,	  defined	  and	  ordered	  
according	  to	  the	  strictness	  of	  their	  commitments.	  These	  classes	  will	  guide	  our	  evaluation	  of	  
pancomputationalist	  theses	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
Weak:	  	   A	  computational	  description	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  is	  weak	  if	  it	  satisfies	  only	  S	  and	  
P,	  S’	  and	  P,	  or	  S	  and	  P’.	  
Robust:	  	   A	  computational	  description	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  is	  robust	  if	  it	  satisfies	  S'	  and	  P'	  
but	  not	  U.	  	  	  
Strong:	  	   A	  computational	  description	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  is	  strong	  if	  it	  satisfies	  S',	  P',	  and	  
U.	  	  	  
The	  commitments	  S	  and	  P	  seem	  to	  be	  required	  for	  any	  computational	  description	  of	  a	  physical	  system,	  
so	  computational	  descriptions	  that	  satisfy	  S	  and	  P	  (and	  nothing	  more)	  are	  absolutely	  minimal.	  The	  
account	  of	  computation	  that	  requires	  these	  and	  only	  these	  minimal	  commitments	  is	  sometimes	  called	  
the	  simple	  mapping	  account	  (Godfrey-­‐Smith	  2009).	  Slightly	  stronger	  computational	  descriptions	  that	  
satisfy	  S’	  and	  P	  or	  S	  and	  P’,	  but	  not	  S’	  and	  P’,	  are	  also	  weak,	  simply	  because	  they	  fail	  either	  to	  require	  
faithful	  physical	  representations	  of	  computational	  states	  or	  to	  provide	  a	  nontrivial	  specification	  of	  
computational	  state	  transitions	  in	  terms	  of	  microphysical	  state	  transitions.	  	  	  
Robust	  computational	  descriptions	  are	  stronger,	  in	  that	  they	  include	  additional	  restrictions	  on	  the	  
physical	  representation	  of	  computational	  states	  and/or	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  system’s	  dynamics,	  but	  they	  
do	  not	  include	  any	  usability	  criteria.	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  robustness	  condition	  (S’	  and	  P’)	  that	  we	  require	  
of	  robust	  descriptions	  harmonizes	  the	  computational	  and	  the	  microphysical,	  ensuring	  that	  specification	  
of	  a	  system’s	  physical	  microstate	  and	  state-­‐space	  trajectory	  says	  no	  more	  and	  no	  less	  about	  the	  system’s	  
computational	  state	  and	  state	  transitions	  than	  does	  specification	  of	  the	  computational	  state	  and	  state	  
transition	  to	  which	  that	  microstate	  and	  state-­‐space	  trajectory	  belong.	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Our	  robustness	  condition	  belongs	  to	  a	  family	  of	  conditions	  suggested	  by	  various	  authors	  to	  make	  
computational	  description	  nontrivial.	  Specifically,	  counterfactual	  accounts	  of	  computation	  require	  that	  
computational	  state	  transitions	  support	  counterfactuals	  (Block	  1978,	  Maudlin	  1989,	  Copeland	  1996,	  
Rescorla	  2014);	  causal	  accounts	  require	  that	  computational	  state	  transitions	  mirror	  the	  causal	  structure	  
of	  the	  physical	  system	  (Chrisley	  1995,	  Chalmers	  1995,	  1996,	  2011,	  Scheutz	  1999,	  2001);	  dispositional	  
accounts	  require	  that	  computational	  state	  transitions	  follow	  from	  the	  system’s	  dispositions	  (Klein	  2008);	  
a	  final	  account	  requires	  that	  the	  physical	  microstates	  correspond	  to	  a	  computational	  state	  must	  be	  
similar	  to	  each	  other	  in	  a	  causally	  relevant	  way	  (Godfrey-­‐Smith	  2009).	  Our	  robustness	  condition	  
improves	  upon	  each	  of	  these	  individual	  proposals	  by	  being	  more	  comprehensive—capturing	  the	  spirit	  of	  
all	  of	  them—and	  by	  being	  more	  precise.8	  	  	  
Finally,	  we	  take	  strong	  computational	  descriptions	  to	  be	  those	  that	  require	  P’	  –	  the	  strongest	  
commitment	  regarding	  computational	  processes	  –	  and	  the	  usability	  criterion	  U,	  which	  together	  with	  S’	  
seem	  to	  constitute	  the	  minimal	  commitments	  required	  for	  computing	  artifacts	  such	  as	  computing	  
machines.	  (Familiar	  electronic	  digital	  computing	  devices	  unambiguously	  admit	  strong	  computational	  
descriptions.)	  We	  ignore	  computational	  descriptions	  that	  require	  U	  but	  only	  P	  or	  S	  (or	  both)	  on	  the	  
following	  grounds:	  processes	  whose	  computational	  structure	  does	  not	  correspond	  to	  their	  physical	  
causal	  structure	  –	  i.e.,	  that	  do	  not	  satisfy	  P’	  –	  simply	  could	  not	  be	  used	  by	  agents	  to	  evaluate	  pre-­‐
specified	  functions	  for	  arbitrary	  inputs.	  Processes	  that	  satisfy	  P’	  but	  violate	  S’	  –	  so	  they	  do	  not	  produce	  
faithful	  physical	  realizers	  of	  computational	  states	  –	  are	  usable	  in	  a	  strict	  sense	  but	  are	  not	  very	  useful	  as	  
they	  leave	  computational	  work	  undone;	  the	  agent	  must	  do	  more	  to	  complete	  evaluation	  of	  the	  desired	  
function.	  These	  exclusions	  will	  be	  substantiated	  in	  the	  section	  3(a),	  where	  we	  give	  examples	  of	  systems	  
that	  satisfy	  only	  P’	  but	  not	  S’	  (such	  as	  a	  falling	  apple)	  or	  vice	  versa	  (such	  as	  a	  random	  system).	  These	  
systems	  clearly	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  functions	  for	  arguments	  of	  one’s	  choosing.	  
3.	  Varieties	  of	  Pancomputationalism	  
	  
Pancomputationalist	  theses	  vary	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  many	  computations—all,	  many,	  a	  few,	  or	  just	  
one—they	  attribute	  to	  each	  system.	  We	  now	  analyze	  unlimited	  and	  limited	  PC	  and	  the	  classes	  of	  
computational	  descriptions	  that	  are	  required	  to	  support	  them.	  After	  that	  we	  discuss	  ontic	  PC,	  which	  is	  a	  
kind	  of	  limited	  PC.	  
3(a).	  	  Unlimited	  PC	  
	  
The	  strong	  version	  of	  pancomputationalism	  is	  unlimited	  PC	  (Putnam	  1988,	  Searle	  1992):	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Using	  the	  representational	  faithfulness	  and	  computational	  fidelity	  measures	  together,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  quantify	  
the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  robustness	  condition	  is	  satisfied	  in	  concrete	  scenarios.	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Unlimited	  PC:	   Every	  physical	  system	  performs	  every	  computation	  —or	  at	  least,	  every	  
sufficiently	  complex	  system	  implements	  a	  large	  number	  of	  non-­‐equivalent	  
computations.	  
We	  now	  consider	  various	  forms	  of	  unlimited	  PC	  in	  detail.	  
The	  first	  argument	  for	  something	  like	  unlimited	  PC	  is	  known	  as	  Hinckfuss’s	  pail,	  after	  its	  proponent	  Ian	  
Hinckfuss.	  According	  to	  William	  Lycan’s	  first	  published	  account	  of	  Hinckfuss’s	  pail,	  a	  pail	  of	  water	  
contains	  a	  large	  number	  of	  microscopic	  processes,	  which	  are	  complex	  enough	  to	  realize	  computations	  
equivalent	  to	  those	  of	  a	  human	  mind—and	  by	  implication,	  any	  computation—at	  least	  for	  a	  brief	  time	  
period	  (Lycan	  1981,	  39).	  	  
Other	  authors	  articulate	  similar	  arguments	  in	  greater	  detail.	  John	  Searle	  argues	  that	  whether	  a	  physical	  
system	  implements	  a	  computation	  depends	  on	  how	  it	  is	  interpreted	  by	  an	  observer.	  Therefore,	  for	  any	  
sufficiently	  complex	  system—such	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  wall	  with	  all	  its	  interacting	  particles—and	  any	  
computation,	  the	  system	  can	  rightfully	  be	  regarded	  as	  performing	  that	  computation	  at	  least	  for	  a	  brief	  
time	  period.	  Since	  Searle’s	  conclusion	  is	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  physical	  computation	  depends	  on	  
the	  free	  interpretation	  of	  physical	  systems,	  it	  may	  be	  called	  interpretive	  unlimited	  PC.	  
Hilary	  Putnam	  gives	  a	  more	  rigorous	  argument	  for	  unlimited	  PC.	  With	  respect	  to	  finite	  automata	  without	  
inputs	  and	  outputs,	  he	  argues	  that	  every	  ordinary	  open	  system	  implements	  every	  finite	  automaton	  
(Putnam	  1988,	  122-­‐3).	  With	  respect	  to	  finite	  automata	  with	  inputs	  and	  outputs,	  he	  argues	  that	  any	  
physical	  system	  whose	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  are	  isomorphic	  to	  those	  of	  the	  finite	  automaton	  implements	  
the	  finite	  automaton.	  Putnam’s	  conclusion	  about	  automata	  with	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  is	  far	  weaker	  than	  
his	  conclusion	  about	  automata	  without	  inputs	  and	  outputs,	  since,	  for	  nontrivial	  abstract	  automata,	  
physical	  systems	  with	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  that	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  being	  “isomorphic”	  to	  those	  of	  the	  
abstract	  automata	  will	  be	  of	  an	  exceedingly	  special	  nature	  and	  thus	  not	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  
consideration	  unlimited	  PC	  (which	  is	  supposed	  to	  apply	  to	  all	  physical	  systems).	  We	  thus	  focus	  on	  his	  
arguments	  that	  are	  germane	  to	  FSA	  without	  inputs	  and	  outputs,	  except	  in	  a	  relatively	  weak	  sense	  to	  be	  
discussed	  below.	  
Unlike	  Searle,	  Putnam	  does	  not	  appeal	  explicitly	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  interpretation	  in	  defending	  unlimited	  
PC.	  But	  his	  argument	  relies	  on	  slicing	  and	  aggregating	  a	  system’s	  dynamics	  in	  arbitrary	  ways.	  Each	  
arbitrary	  slicing	  and	  aggregating	  is	  one	  of	  indefinitely	  many	  possible	  computational	  interpretations	  of	  
the	  system.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Putnam’s	  view	  is	  an	  example	  of	  interpretive	  unlimited	  PC.	  Indeed,	  some	  form	  
of	  free	  computational	  interpretation	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  appears	  to	  be	  behind	  every	  defense	  of	  
unlimited	  PC	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  else	  unlimited	  PC	  could	  be	  motivated.	  By	  
the	  same	  token,	  the	  rejection	  of	  unlimited	  PC	  hinges	  on	  devising	  privileged,	  objective	  computational	  
interpretations	  of	  a	  physical	  system.	  	  
If	  unlimited	  PC	  is	  correct,	  then	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  physical	  system	  performs	  a	  computation	  becomes	  almost	  
trivially	  true	  and	  vacuous;	  it	  fails	  to	  distinguish	  that	  system	  from	  anything	  else	  (or	  perhaps	  from	  anything	  
else	  with	  the	  same	  inputs	  and	  outputs).	  Because	  of	  this,	  unlimited	  PC	  is	  incongruous	  with	  computer	  
science	  and	  engineering,	  where	  objective	  differences	  in	  the	  computational	  capacities	  of	  different	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systems	  are	  critical	  and	  great	  effort	  is	  expended	  to	  realize	  physical	  systems	  with	  desired	  computational	  
capacities.	  Where	  exactly,	  in	  this	  respect,	  does	  unlimited	  PC	  fall	  short?	  
	  
Unlimited	  PC	  is	  Supported	  Only	  Under	  Weak	  Computational	  Descriptions	  
We	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  unlimited	  PC	  is	  supported	  only	  under	  weak	  computational	  descriptions	  because	  
it	  violates	  S’,	  P’,	  or	  both.	  We	  show	  explicitly	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  for	  five	  different	  pancomputationalist	  
claims.	  	  	  
Since	  we	  are	  going	  to	  discuss	  inputless	  and	  outputless	  FSA,	  however,	  we	  should	  first	  discuss	  the	  sense	  in	  
which	  they	  can	  be	  said	  to	  evaluate	  a	  function	  defined	  over	  inputs.	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  to	  think	  about	  
inputs	  and	  how	  FSAs	  can	  compute	  over	  them.	  The	  two	  ways	  are	  not	  completely	  distinct,	  but	  we'll	  talk	  
about	  them	  separately	  for	  clarity.	  First,	  a	  string	  of	  inputs	  can	  be	  fed	  into	  an	  FSA	  as	  it	  is	  evolving,	  with	  (at	  
least	  some)	  state	  transitions	  conditioned	  on	  some	  "incoming"	  input	  values	  until	  the	  desired	  
computation	  has	  been	  completed.	  (This	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  branching	  of	  FSA	  state	  diagrams.)	  Second,	  
the	  same	  computation	  could	  be	  done	  over	  the	  same	  input	  string	  by	  a	  different	  FSA—an	  "inputless"	  
FSA—by	  mapping	  all	  possible	  input	  strings	  into	  initial	  FSA	  states	  and	  letting	  the	  FSA	  evolve	  (without	  
further	  input	  influence)	  until	  the	  computation	  has	  been	  completed.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  
microprocessor	  that	  performs	  a	  computation	  on	  input	  data	  initially	  stored	  in	  its	  internal	  registers	  and	  
then	  halts;	  no	  external	  inputs	  influence	  evolution	  of	  the	  processor	  state	  during	  the	  computation.	  
	  
This	  second	  possibility	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  claims	  that	  FSA	  that	  are	  inputless	  (in	  the	  first	  sense)	  can	  
perform	  computations	  over	  inputs	  or	  strings	  of	  inputs	  (in	  the	  second	  sense),	  with	  the	  crucial	  proviso	  that	  
various	  initial	  states	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  various	  inputs.	  For	  strong	  computational	  descriptions,	  
however,	  users	  must	  be	  able	  to	  prepare	  these	  initial	  states,	  which,	  alas,	  amounts	  to	  an	  external	  
influence	  affecting	  at	  least	  one	  state	  transition—the	  "zeroeth"	  state	  transition—and	  becomes	  a	  special	  
case	  of	  the	  first	  possibility.	  (In	  the	  above	  example,	  a	  user	  would	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  load	  data	  into	  the	  
processor	  register	  states.)	  For	  weak	  and	  robust	  descriptions,	  instead,	  users	  need	  not	  be	  able	  to	  prepare	  
these	  initial	  states	  –	  the	  initial	  states	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  present	  regardless	  of	  any	  user’s	  intervention.	  
Similarly,	  one	  can	  claim	  that	  outputless	  FSA	  perform	  computations	  by	  taking	  the	  final	  states	  to	  be	  
encodings	  of	  the	  output.	  For	  example,	  a	  pancomputationalist	  could	  claim	  that	  the	  output	  of	  a	  
computation	  performed	  by	  a	  falling	  leaf	  is	  instantiated	  in	  its	  final	  resting	  position	  on	  the	  ground,	  without	  
being	  required	  to	  specify	  a	  unique	  logical	  mapping	  between	  the	  leaf	  position	  and	  some	  abstract	  symbol	  
from	  an	  output	  set.	  







We	  begin	  with	  Putnam’s	  construction,	  which	  aims	  to	  show	  that	  any	  sufficiently	  complex	  open	  system,	  
such	  as	  a	  rock,	  implements	  any	  inputless	  and	  outputless	  finite-­‐state	  automaton.	  His	  assumptions	  are	  
minimal:	  First,	  electromagnetic	  and	  gravitational	  fields	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  continuous.	  Second,	  physical	  
systems	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  in	  different	  maximal	  states—different	  physical	  microstates—at	  different	  
times,	  with	  no	  microstate	  ever	  visited	  more	  than	  once	  as	  a	  system	  evolves	  along	  any	  dynamically	  
supported	  trajectory.	  This	  second	  condition,	  which	  Putnam	  calls	  the	  Principle	  of	  Non-­‐Cyclical	  Behavior,	  is	  
assumed	  to	  hold	  for	  any	  system	  that	  cannot	  be	  completely	  shielded	  from	  the	  fields	  associated	  with	  
external	  systems	  that	  have	  an	  arrow	  of	  time,	  and	  it	  effectively	  builds	  a	  “time	  stamp”	  into	  physical	  
microstates.	  
Putnam	  considers	  a	  finite	  automaton	  that	  goes	  through	  the	  sequence	  of	  states	  ABABABA,	  and	  an	  
arbitrary	  physical	  system	  S	  over	  the	  arbitrarily	  chosen	  time	  interval	  from	  12:00	  to	  12:07	  on	  an	  arbitrary	  
day.	  Putnam	  argues	  that	  S	  implements	  the	  sequence	  ABABABA.	  Since	  both	  the	  automaton	  and	  the	  
physical	  system	  are	  arbitrary,	  Putnam	  claims,	  the	  argument	  generalizes	  to	  any	  physical	  system	  and	  any	  
(inputless	  and	  outputless)	  automaton.	  Putnam's	  argument	  goes	  as	  follows:	  
Let	  the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  intervals	  during	  which	  S	  is	  to	  be	  in	  one	  of	  its	  stages	  A	  or	  B	  be	  t1,t2…	  tn	  
(in	  the	  example	  given,	  n	  =	  7,	  and	  the	  times	  in	  question	  are	  t1	  =	  12:00,	  t2	  =	  12:01,	  t3	  =	  12:02,	  t4	  =	  
12:03,	  t5	  =	  12:04,	  t6	  =	  12:05,	  t7	  =	  12:06).	  The	  end	  of	  the	  real-­‐time	  interval	  during	  which	  we	  wish	  S	  
to	  “obey”	  this	  [computational	  description]	  we	  call	  tn+1	  (=t8	  =	  12:07,	  in	  our	  example).	  For	  each	  of	  
the	  intervals	  ti	  to	  ti+1,	  i	  =	  1,	  2,	  …,	  n,	  define	  a	  (nonmaximal)	  interval	  state	  si	  which	  is	  the	  “region”	  in	  
phase	  space	  consisting	  of	  all	  the	  maximal	  states	  …	  with	  ti	  ≤	  t	  <	  ti+1.	  (i.e.,	  S	  is	  in	  si	  just	  in	  case	  S	  is	  in	  
one	  of	  the	  maximal	  states	  in	  this	  “region.”)	  Note	  that	  the	  system	  S	  is	  in	  s1	  from	  t1	  to	  t2,	  in	  s2	  from	  
t2	  to	  t3,	  …,	  in	  sn	  from	  tn	  to	  tn+1.	  (Left	  endpoint	  included	  in	  all	  cases	  but	  not	  the	  right	  —	  this	  is	  a	  
convention	  to	  ensure	  the	  “machine”	  is	  in	  exactly	  one	  of	  the	  si	  at	  a	  given	  time.)	  …	  
Define	  A	  =	  s1	  ∨	  s3	  ∨	  s5	  ∨	  s7;	  B	  =	  s2	  ∨	  s4	  ∨	  s6.	  
Then,	  as	  is	  easily	  checked,	  S	  is	  in	  state	  A	  from	  t1	  to	  t2,	  from	  t3	  to	  t4,	  and	  from	  t5	  to	  t6,	  and	  from	  t7	  
to	  t8,	  and	  in	  state	  B	  at	  all	  other	  times	  between	  t1	  and	  t8.	  So	  S	  “has”	  the	  table9	  we	  specified,	  with	  
the	  states	  A,B	  we	  just	  defined	  as	  the	  “realizations”	  of	  the	  states	  A,B	  described	  by	  the	  table.	  
(Putnam	  1988,	  122–3,	  emphasis	  original)	  
To	  sum	  up,	  Putnam	  begins	  with	  an	  arbitrary	  physical	  system	  (e.g.,	  an	  ordinary	  rock),	  slices	  up	  its	  
continuous	  dynamics	  into	  arbitrary	  time	  intervals,	  and	  then	  aggregates	  the	  slices	  so	  that	  the	  aggregated	  
slices	  correspond	  to	  arbitrary	  computational	  states	  and	  the	  system’s	  dynamics	  correspond	  to	  an	  
arbitrary	  sequence	  of	  computational	  states.	  He	  concludes	  that	  every	  physical	  system	  implements	  every	  
inputless	  and	  outputless	  finite	  automaton.	  Allowing	  that	  inputless	  finite-­‐state	  automata	  may	  be	  defined	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  “Table”	  is	  Putnam’s	  term	  for	  the	  transition	  rules	  that	  determine	  the	  computational	  state	  transitions	  of	  a	  finite-­‐
state	  automaton.	  He	  calls	  the	  physical	  state	  subspace	  si	  visited	  in	  the	  time	  interval	  ti	  to	  ti+1	  an	  “interval	  state”,	  
although	  it	  is	  not	  a	  properly	  defined	  physical	  state.	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so	  that	  their	  initial	  states	  encode	  (finitely	  many)	  arbitrary	  digital	  inputs	  and	  their	  final	  states	  encode	  
(finitely	  many)	  arbitrary	  digital	  outputs,	  Putnam’s	  conclusion	  might	  in	  this	  sense	  be	  supposed	  to	  
generalize	  to	  all	  finite-­‐state	  automata	  with	  inputs	  and	  outputs.	  
The	  first	  thing	  to	  notice	  is	  that	  Putnam’s	  construction	  seems	  to	  satisfy	  S,	  which	  requires	  that	  
computational	  states	  correspond	  to	  distinct	  physical	  microstates	  of	  a	  system	  or	  disjunctions	  of	  physical	  
microstates.	  To	  be	  sure,	  S	  requires	  that	  this	  hold	  for	  any	  trajectory	  of	  the	  system	  through	  state	  space,	  
whereas	  Putnam	  defines	  his	  construction	  only	  for	  one	  trajectory.	  But	  the	  trajectory	  selected	  by	  Putnam	  
is	  an	  arbitrary	  one,	  and	  every	  trajectory	  is	  presumed	  to	  be	  similarly	  “time	  stamped”,	  so	  his	  construction	  
generalizes	  to	  all	  possible	  dynamically	  supported	  trajectories.	  	  	  
By	  the	  same	  token,	  Putnam’s	  construction	  seems	  to	  satisfy	  P,	  which	  requires	  that	  computational	  state	  
transitions	  correspond	  to	  time	  evolutions	  of	  a	  system’s	  physical	  microstates,	  possibly	  restricted	  to	  
specific	  time	  intervals.	  Again,	  for	  P	  to	  actually	  be	  satisfied,	  Putnam’s	  construction	  needs	  to	  be	  
generalized	  to	  all	  trajectories	  of	  the	  system,	  but	  this	  alone	  is	  unproblematic.	  By	  satisfying	  S	  and	  P,	  
Putnam’s	  construction	  for	  inputless	  automata	  qualifies	  at	  least	  as	  a	  weak	  computational	  description	  in	  
the	  present	  sense.	  We	  now	  address	  whether	  it	  can	  also	  satisfy	  S’	  and	  P’,	  as	  robust	  and	  strong	  
computational	  descriptions	  require,	  and	  whether	  it	  does	  indeed	  generalize	  to	  include	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  
that	  are	  themselves	  encoded	  in	  FSA	  states.	  
S’	  requires	  that	  computational	  states	  correspond	  to	  distinct	  physical	  microstates	  of	  a	  system,	  or	  to	  
statistical	  states	  defined	  independently	  on	  disjoint	  regions	  of	  a	  system’s	  state	  space.	  The	  computational	  
states	  defined	  by	  Putnam	  do	  correspond	  to	  disjoint	  regions	  of	  a	  system’s	  state	  space,	  but	  not	  to	  
statistical	  states	  as	  we	  have	  defined	  them	  in	  Sec.	  2(a)—as	  statistical	  states	  that	  encode	  nothing	  more	  
about	  the	  system’s	  dynamical	  history	  than	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  computational	  description.	  Putnam’s	  
construction	  fails	  in	  this	  respect,	  as	  we	  now	  argue.	  	  
In	  Putnam’s	  construction,	  it	  is	  clearly	  not	  the	  case	  that	  every	  microstate	  belonging	  to	  a	  given	  
computational	  state	  evolves	  from	  every	  microstate	  belonging	  to	  its	  predecessor	  computational	  state	  
with	  the	  same	  probability,	  i.e.,	  that	  statistical	  physical	  states	  can	  be	  unconditionally	  assigned	  to	  
computational	  states.	  A	  microstate	  in	  the	  subspace	  s2,	  for	  example,	  belongs	  to	  computational	  state	  B,	  
which	  is	  always	  preceded	  by	  computational	  state	  A.	  But	  this	  microstate	  can	  only	  have	  evolved	  from	  
microstates	  in	  subspace	  s1	  of	  computational	  state	  A;	  it	  could	  not	  have	  evolved	  from	  the	  microstates	  in	  
subspaces	  s3	  and	  s5	  that	  also	  constitute	  A.	  This	  is	  a	  straightforward	  violation	  of	  S’.	  
This	  may	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  S’	  is	  overly	  restrictive.	  After	  all,	  Putnam’s	  construction	  ensures	  that	  a	  
microstate	  in	  computational	  state	  B	  (e.g.	  in	  s2)	  evolves	  from	  a	  microstate	  in	  computational	  state	  A	  (e.g.	  
in	  s1)	  and	  that	  it	  will	  evolve	  into	  a	  microstate	  in	  computational	  state	  A	  (e.g.	  in	  s3),	  thus	  respecting	  the	  
state	  transitions	  of	  the	  FSA	  under	  consideration	  and	  perhaps	  seeming	  to	  satisfy	  the	  “spirit”	  of	  S’.	  
However,	  the	  example	  FSA	  of	  Putnam’s	  construction	  has	  the	  property	  that	  every	  computational	  state	  
has	  a	  unique	  predecessor,	  and	  is	  far	  from	  arbitrary	  in	  this	  sense.	  His	  example	  need	  only	  be	  complicated	  
slightly	  to	  more	  clearly	  reveal	  the	  failure	  to	  satisfy	  S’	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  failure.	  We	  illustrate	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this	  with	  two	  example	  FSA	  that	  augment	  Putnam’s	  example	  FSA	  with	  a	  third	  state	  and	  that	  include	  one	  
computational	  state	  that	  has	  more	  than	  one	  predecessor.	  
First,	  consider	  an	  FSA	  with	  computational	  states	  A,	  B	  and	  C.	  A	  and	  B	  obey	  the	  same	  transition	  rules	  as	  in	  
Putnam’s	  example,	  but	  C	  is	  an	  initial	  state	  that	  cannot	  be	  “reached”	  by	  either	  A	  or	  B	  and	  always	  
transitions	  to	  B.	  Over	  the	  time	  interval	  considered	  in	  Putnam’s	  example,	  this	  FSA	  thus	  goes	  through	  the	  
sequence	  CBABABA.	  State	  B	  now	  has	  two	  predecessors—state	  C	  and	  state	  A—which	  transition	  into	  B	  at	  
different	  times.	  To	  say	  that	  the	  system	  is	  in	  a	  microstate	  belonging	  to	  subspace	  s2	  says	  not	  only	  that	  the	  
system	  is	  in	  computational	  state	  B,	  but	  also	  that	  its	  predecessor	  was	  computational	  state	  C	  rather	  than	  
computational	  state	  A;	  the	  microstate	  encodes	  more	  information	  about	  the	  system’s	  dynamical	  history	  
than	  is	  available	  in	  the	  computational	  description	  (computational	  states	  and	  transition	  rules).	  Second,	  
consider	  a	  three-­‐state	  FSA	  where	  A	  always	  transitions	  to	  B,	  B	  always	  transitions	  to	  C,	  and	  C	  always	  
transitions	  to	  itself	  (i.e.	  C	  is	  a	  halting	  state).	  Suppose	  that	  over	  the	  time	  interval	  considered	  in	  Putnam’s	  
example,	  this	  FSA	  goes	  through	  the	  sequence	  ABCCCCC.	  Here,	  state	  C	  has	  two	  predecessors—state	  B	  
and	  itself.	  Retaining	  Putnam’s	  time	  intervals	  and	  associated	  state	  subspace	  labels,	  this	  system	  is	  in	  
computational	  state	  C	  when	  its	  microstate	  belongs	  to	  the	  subspaces	  s3-­‐s7.	  However,	  its	  predecessor	  
computational	  state	  is	  identifiable	  as	  A	  if	  the	  microstate	  is	  in	  s3	  and	  as	  C	  if	  the	  microstate	  is	  in	  s4-­‐s7.	  Here,	  
physical	  microstates	  are	  again	  encoding	  more	  about	  the	  system’s	  computational	  history	  than	  the	  
system’s	  present	  computational	  state.	  
Failure	  to	  satisfy	  S’	  in	  both	  spirit	  and	  letter,	  established	  above,	  is	  enough	  to	  preclude	  association	  of	  
Putnam’s	  construction	  with	  anything	  stronger	  than	  a	  weak	  computational	  description.	  It	  is	  instructive,	  
however,	  to	  also	  consider	  potential	  satisfaction	  of	  P’.	  
P’	  requires	  that	  during	  the	  relevant	  time	  intervals,	  each	  physical	  microstate	  that	  corresponds	  to	  a	  given	  
computational	  state	  evolve	  from	  (into)	  a	  microstate	  that	  corresponds	  to	  its	  predecessor	  (successor)	  
computational	  state	  as	  specified	  by	  a	  set	  {(C,I)àC’}	  of	  deterministic	  state	  transition	  rules.	  Since	  
Putnam’s	  construction	  is	  specifically	  for	  inputless	  FSA,	  satisfaction	  of	  P’	  can	  only	  be	  tested	  for	  sets	  
{CàC’}	  of	  deterministic	  state	  transition	  rules.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  separately	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  inputs	  
encoded	  in	  initial	  states	  of	  otherwise	  “inputless”	  FSA,	  then	  we	  must	  also	  consider	  situations	  where	  
multiple	  possibilities	  for	  initial	  FSA	  computational	  states	  are	  defined.	  
Putnam’s	  construction	  can	  indeed	  accommodate	  computational	  state	  transitions	  for	  arbitrary	  inputless	  
FSA,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  and	  does	  satisfy	  P’	  for	  such	  FSA	  provided	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  possible	  initial	  
state.	  Such	  FSA	  are,	  however,	  of	  a	  very	  restricted	  and	  trivial	  class.	  	  	  
If	  we	  wish	  to	  broaden	  this	  class	  just	  enough	  to	  accommodate	  multiple	  possibilities	  for	  initial	  states,	  and	  
thus	  accommodate	  inputs	  in	  the	  only	  sense	  that	  FSA	  with	  no	  state	  branching	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  
accommodating	  inputs,	  we	  must	  associate	  distinct	  subspaces	  of	  the	  physical	  system’s	  state	  space	  at	  the	  
initial	  time	  (t1	  in	  Putnam’s	  construction)	  with	  separate	  initial	  FSA	  computational	  states—one	  for	  each	  
FSA	  input	  or	  input	  string.	  (Even	  S	  would	  require	  as	  much.)	  If	  the	  inputs	  encoded	  in	  this	  manner	  are	  to	  
influence	  the	  FSA	  behavior—and	  thus	  have	  any	  meaning	  as	  FSA	  inputs—then	  the	  FSA	  must	  at	  later	  times	  
be	  in	  computational	  states	  that	  depend	  upon	  the	  initial	  states	  and	  depend	  upon	  them	  in	  the	  right	  way.	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This	  requires	  that	  we	  associate	  distinct	  subspaces	  of	  the	  physical	  system’s	  state	  space	  at	  every	  
computationally	  relevant	  time	  t>	  t1	  with	  each	  FSA	  computational	  state	  that,	  given	  the	  possibilities	  for	  
initial	  states	  and	  the	  FSA	  table,	  could	  be	  accessed	  at	  that	  time.	  This	  alone	  is	  unproblematic	  and	  utterly	  
conventional.	  However,	  it	  also	  requires	  that	  all	  microstates	  belonging	  to	  a	  particular	  state	  subspace	  at	  
initial	  time	  t1	  evolve	  into	  the	  right	  state	  subspace	  at	  later	  times,	  necessitating	  the	  imposition	  of	  
constraints	  on	  the	  system’s	  dynamics.	  Without	  such	  constraints,	  nothing	  prevents	  two	  microstates	  
associated	  with	  different	  initial	  computational	  states	  at	  t1	  from	  evolving	  into	  the	  same	  microstate	  at	  
some	  computationally	  time	  ti>	  t1—even	  when	  the	  FSA	  transition	  rules	  would	  require	  that	  these	  initial	  
computational	  states	  end	  up	  in	  different	  computational	  states	  at	  ti.	  For	  the	  arbitrary	  dynamics	  of	  
Putnam’s	  construction,	  which	  admit	  temporally	  intersecting	  microstate	  trajectories,	  there	  are	  by	  
definition	  no	  such	  dynamical	  constraints	  and	  P’	  cannot	  be	  satisfied	  for	  FSA	  with	  multiple	  initial	  states.	  	  
No	  modified	  construction	  that	  includes	  dynamical	  constraints	  ensuring	  satisfaction	  of	  P’	  in	  such	  
scenarios	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  variant	  of	  Putnam’s,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  arbitrary	  
dynamics	  of	  arbitrary	  physical	  systems	  implement	  arbitrary	  FSA.	  
In	  conclusion,	  Putnam’s	  construction	  is	  supported	  only	  under	  weak	  computational	  descriptions	  of	  
physical	  systems—it	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  both	  S’	  and	  P’.	  More	  specifically,	  while	  it	  satisfies	  P’	  for	  FSA	  that	  are	  
inputless	  and	  outputless	  in	  the	  usual	  sense,	  it	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  P’	  for	  FSA	  with	  inputs	  encoded	  in	  their	  initial	  
states	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  always	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  S’.	  Putnam’s	  construction	  comes	  closest	  to	  satisfying	  
both	  S’	  and	  P’	  for	  FSA	  with	  only	  one	  possible	  initial	  computational	  state	  and	  without	  any	  computational	  
states	  that	  have	  more	  than	  one	  predecessor	  computational	  state—an	  exceedingly	  special	  and	  trivial	  
subclass	  of	  FSA—but	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  S’	  even	  here.	  	  	  
One	  final	  remark	  on	  Putnam’s	  construction	  is	  in	  order	  before	  we	  move	  on.	  The	  physical	  microstates	  that	  
lie	  along	  any	  given	  trajectory	  in	  Putnam’s	  construction	  are	  again	  distinguished	  from	  one	  another	  by	  their	  
implicit	  “time	  stamp”—a	  signature	  of	  interaction	  with	  fields	  generated	  by	  an	  external	  “clock”	  system	  
(e.g.	  the	  solar	  system).	  This	  time	  stamp	  renders	  other	  details	  of	  the	  microstate	  trajectories	  unimportant	  
for	  the	  purposes	  of	  associating	  microstates	  with	  time	  intervals	  and	  thus	  with	  computational	  states	  in	  his	  
construction.	  It	  is	  indeed	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  every	  system	  is	  unavoidably	  bathed	  is	  such	  fields	  
and	  necessarily	  interacts	  with	  them.	  It	  is	  not,	  however,	  clear	  that	  such	  fields	  provide	  the	  time	  stamp	  on	  
the	  physical	  microstates	  that	  Putnam	  requires:	  the	  evolution	  of	  physical	  microstates	  is	  indeed	  
influenced	  by	  externally	  applied	  fields,	  but	  particle	  microstates	  themselves	  are	  typically	  defined	  in	  terms	  
of	  time-­‐independent	  coordinates,	  velocities,	  etc.	  and	  not	  the	  forces	  acting	  upon	  them.	  In	  the	  above,	  we	  
have	  given	  Putnam	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt	  and	  assumed	  that	  the	  microstates	  are	  indeed	  “time	  
stamped”	  as	  he	  requires.	  	  	  
If	  one	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  accept	  that	  all	  microstates	  lying	  along	  every	  trajectory	  are	  distinguished	  by	  the	  
external	  clock	  field,	  then	  there	  are	  two	  alternatives.	  First,	  if	  one	  wanted	  all	  microstates	  along	  every	  
trajectory	  to	  be	  distinguished	  by	  a	  time	  stamp	  as	  in	  Putnam’s	  construction	  but	  did	  not	  want	  to	  rely	  on	  
external	  fields	  to	  provide	  it,	  one	  could	  just	  glue	  a	  stopwatch	  to	  Putnam’s	  rock	  or	  any	  other	  system	  to	  
build	  an	  internal	  clock	  into	  that	  system.	  Although	  this	  would	  not	  weaken	  Putnam’s	  conclusion	  very	  
much—it	  would	  still	  be	  radical	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  rock	  glued	  to	  a	  stopwatch	  implements	  every	  FSA—it	  
would	  not	  immunize	  his	  argument	  from	  the	  objections	  we	  have	  advanced	  here.	  Alternatively,	  if	  one	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wanted	  to	  abandon	  the	  requirement	  for	  time	  stamping	  of	  the	  physical	  microstates	  altogether,	  they	  
could	  simply	  distinguish	  the	  microstates	  belonging	  to	  different	  computational	  states	  solely	  by	  standard	  
state	  variables	  (e.g.	  coordinates	  and	  velocities).	  This	  comports	  with	  the	  conventional	  practice	  of	  
mapping	  between	  computational	  states	  and	  physical	  states—with	  no	  temporal	  reference—assumed	  for	  
real	  computing	  systems.	  Here,	  however,	  the	  association	  of	  microstate	  trajectories	  with	  sequences	  of	  
computational	  states	  is	  no	  longer	  arbitrary.	  With	  no	  notion	  of	  time	  stamping,	  and	  under	  arbitrary	  
dynamics,	  there	  is	  no	  prohibition	  against	  any	  given	  microstate	  being	  visited	  more	  than	  once	  along	  a	  
dynamically	  supported	  trajectory	  (even	  if	  this	  is	  unlikely	  in	  all	  but	  the	  smallest	  physical	  systems).	  The	  
non-­‐cyclic	  behavior	  required	  for	  Putnam’s	  argument—that	  any	  physical	  system	  implements	  any	  FSA—is	  
thus	  incompatible	  with	  this	  more	  conventional	  view	  of	  computational-­‐to-­‐physical	  state	  mapping.	  Thus,	  
neither	  of	  the	  above	  alternatives	  to	  Putnam’s	  external	  clock	  allows	  his	  brand	  of	  unlimited	  PC	  to	  be	  
supported	  by	  anything	  stronger	  than	  a	  weak	  computational	  description.	  
Searle’s	  Wall	  and	  Hinckfuss’s	  Pail	  
Searle’s	  wall	  and	  Hinckfuss’	  pail	  contain	  no	  more	  resources	  than	  does	  Putnam’s	  rock,	  so	  they	  fail	  to	  
provide	  computational	  descriptions	  any	  stronger	  than	  those	  provided	  by	  Putnam’s	  construction.	  
Although	  these	  examples	  go	  beyond	  Putnam’s	  in	  that	  they	  are	  purported	  to	  implement	  programs	  that	  
depend	  on	  inputs—word	  processing	  and	  “a	  human	  program”—their	  random	  and	  unconstrained	  
dynamics	  can	  only	  fail	  to	  produce	  the	  right	  dependencies	  between	  states	  and	  inputs	  exactly	  as	  in	  
Putnam’s	  construction.	  At	  best,	  one	  can	  try	  to	  interpret	  trajectories	  through	  the	  state	  space	  
computationally	  as	  Putnam	  does	  for	  his	  rock,	  which,	  even	  with	  inputs	  encoded	  in	  initial	  computational	  
states,	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  satisfies	  both	  S’	  and	  P’	  as	  we	  have	  demonstrated	  above.10	  
A	  Falling	  Apple	  	  
A	  physical	  system	  with	  simple	  deterministic	  dynamics,	  such	  as	  an	  apple	  falling	  from	  a	  tree,	  may	  satisfy	  
not	  only	  P	  but	  also	  P’	  without	  time-­‐stamping	  of	  its	  physical	  states.	  The	  dynamics	  are	  such	  that	  there	  are	  
no	  physical	  states—defined	  here	  by	  the	  position	  of	  the	  apple’s	  center-­‐of-­‐mass	  and	  the	  velocity	  with	  
which	  it	  is	  falling—that	  will	  be	  revisited	  as	  the	  apple	  falls	  to	  the	  ground,	  and	  these	  state	  variables	  alone	  
distinguish	  the	  states.	  If	  segments	  of	  its	  state-­‐space	  trajectory	  are	  labeled	  as	  computational	  states,	  it	  
follows	  that,	  as	  P’	  requires,	  computational	  state	  transitions	  correspond	  to	  time	  evolutions	  of	  a	  system’s	  
physical	  microstates	  such	  that	  during	  the	  relevant	  time	  intervals	  each	  physical	  microstate	  that	  
corresponds	  to	  a	  given	  computational	  state	  evolves	  from	  (into)	  a	  microstate	  that	  corresponds	  to	  its	  
predecessor	  (successor)	  computational	  state	  as	  specified	  by	  the	  computational	  description.	  This	  only	  
works	  if	  we	  are	  not	  looking	  for	  any	  dependence	  on	  inputs	  in	  the	  usual	  sense—the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  
system	  are	  too	  simple	  to	  allow	  for	  that—although	  the	  inputs	  could	  be	  encoded	  in	  initial	  states	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  While	  Searle	  explicitly	  acknowledges	  that	  computation	  requires	  more	  than	  unconstrained	  dynamical	  evolution,	  
he	  leaves	  the	  required	  constraints	  unspecified	  and	  employs	  an	  example—a	  wall—with	  random	  and	  essentially	  
unconstrained	  microphysical	  dynamics.	  His	  key	  point	  is	  that,	  because	  computational	  descriptions	  are	  
underdetermined	  by	  the	  microphysical	  dynamics,	  interpretation	  necessarily	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  using	  a	  physical	  system	  
for	  computation.	  We	  agree	  that	  interpretation	  is	  necessary—if	  grossly	  insufficient—for	  such	  use.	  In	  this	  work	  we	  
are	  addressing	  what	  else	  is	  required	  for	  sufficiency—specifically,	  the	  minimal	  requirements	  on	  a	  system's	  state	  
transformations	  that	  would	  enable	  a	  user	  to	  give	  them	  meaningful	  computational	  interpretations.	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dropping	  the	  apple	  from	  various	  lateral	  positions.	  But	  systems	  of	  this	  kind	  violate	  S’.	  Contrary	  to	  S’,	  all	  
computational	  state	  transitions	  cannot	  “arrive	  at”	  or	  “depart	  from”	  an	  arbitrary	  physical	  microstate	  s	  
belonging	  to	  computational	  state	  C	  with	  probability	  p(s,C)	  regardless	  of	  their	  source.	  Instead,	  the	  system	  
goes	  through	  a	  specific	  sequence	  of	  microstates	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  deterministic	  dynamics,	  so	  the	  
“entry”	  and	  “departure”	  microstates	  for	  a	  computational	  state	  C	  can	  only	  be	  those	  unique	  microstates	  
that	  the	  system	  is	  in	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  end	  of	  the	  time	  interval	  associated	  with	  C.	  By	  violating	  S’,	  this	  
would-­‐be	  (Falling)	  Apple	  Computer	  is	  supported	  only	  under	  weak	  computational	  descriptions.	  
	  
A	  Random	  System	  
A	  system	  with	  completely	  random	  transitions	  between	  microstates	  that	  are	  not	  time-­‐stamped,	  in	  which	  
each	  state	  transitions	  into	  some	  other	  state	  is	  selected	  completely	  at	  random,	  satisfies	  not	  only	  S	  but	  
also	  S’	  by	  definition—the	  probability	  that	  the	  system	  goes	  into	  (or	  comes	  out	  or)	  any	  given	  state	  is	  
independent	  of	  where	  it	  comes	  from	  (goes	  into).	  However,	  for	  this	  same	  reason	  that	  S’	  is	  satisfied,	  
individual	  microstates	  will	  fail	  to	  always	  evolve	  from	  (into)	  predecessor	  (successor)	  microstates	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  respects	  any	  deterministic	  computational	  state	  transition	  rule	  and	  P’	  is	  violated	  even	  for	  inputless	  
FSA.	  (If	  state	  transitions	  depend	  on	  inputs,	  then	  the	  same	  successor	  computational	  state	  must	  be	  
reached	  every	  time	  a	  given	  input	  is	  received	  while	  in	  a	  certain	  computational	  state,	  but	  then	  the	  state	  
transitions	  cannot	  be	  random	  in	  the	  first	  place.)	  So,	  under	  some	  conditions,	  a	  completely	  random	  
system	  can	  satisfy	  S’	  but	  fail	  to	  admit	  a	  robust	  computational	  description.	  
Chalmers’s	  Clock-­‐and-­‐Dial	  System	  	  
David	  Chalmers	  (1996)	  offers	  a	  refinement	  of	  Putnam’s	  construction	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  every	  physical	  
system	  containing	  a	  clock	  and	  a	  dial	  implements	  every	  (inputless	  and	  outputless)	  finite-­‐state	  automaton.	  
By	  “clock,”	  Chalmers	  means	  a	  subsystem	  that	  reliably	  transitions	  through	  a	  sequence	  of	  states	  c1,	  c2,	  …,	  
regardless	  of	  environmental	  conditions.	  By	  “dial,”	  Chalmers	  means	  a	  subsystem,	  with	  an	  arbitrary	  
number	  of	  states	  d1,	  d2,	  …,,	  which	  reliably	  stays	  in	  any	  given	  state	  regardless	  of	  environmental	  
conditions.	  This	  system	  implements	  every	  (inputless	  and	  outputless)	  automaton	  because	  for	  any	  initial	  
state	  of	  the	  automaton,	  a	  dial	  state	  can	  be	  selected,	  and	  the	  sequence	  of	  computational	  states	  that	  
corresponds	  to	  that	  initial	  state	  can	  be	  used	  to	  label	  the	  clock’s	  sequence	  of	  states	  in	  the	  same	  way	  
Putnam	  labels	  the	  microstates	  in	  his	  construction.	  With	  enough	  dial	  positions,	  there	  will	  be	  clock-­‐dial	  
state	  sequences	  available	  for	  mapping	  onto	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  computational	  state	  sequences	  that	  
the	  full	  transition	  table	  of	  any	  FSA	  can	  be	  respected.	  
There	  are	  two	  differences	  between	  Putnam’s	  construction	  and	  Chalmers’s	  dial-­‐and-­‐clock	  system.	  First,	  
the	  latter’s	  states	  and	  state	  transitions	  are	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  system—they	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  interactions	  
between	  the	  system	  and	  its	  environment.	  As	  a	  result,	  one	  need	  not	  rely	  on	  Putnam’s	  Principle	  of	  
Noncyclical	  Behavior	  to	  ensure	  that	  no	  physical	  state	  is	  visited	  more	  than	  once	  at	  computationally	  
relevant	  times	  along	  any	  dynamically	  supported	  trajectory;	  the	  state	  variables	  associated	  with	  the	  
effective	  “hand	  position”	  of	  the	  internal	  clock	  effectively	  provide	  an	  internal	  time-­‐stamp	  that	  is	  built	  
explicitly	  into	  the	  state	  specification.	  Second,	  Chalmers’s	  system	  (unlike	  Putnam’s)	  is	  explicitly	  defined	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for	  all	  state	  space	  trajectories	  even	  with	  inputs	  encoded	  in	  initial	  states.	  Thus,	  Chalmers’s	  system	  is	  
defined	  more	  restrictively	  than	  Putnam’s.	  	  	  
By	  adding	  the	  clock	  and	  dial,	  Chalmers	  solves	  three	  problems	  with	  Putnam’s	  construction.	  First,	  the	  time	  
stamping	  of	  microstates—required	  to	  ensure	  that	  no	  state	  is	  visited	  more	  than	  once	  along	  any	  
dynamically	  supported	  trajectory—is	  unambiguously	  provided	  by	  the	  clock.	  Second,	  states	  and	  state	  
transitions	  that	  are	  reflected	  in	  an	  FSA	  state	  table	  but	  that	  cannot	  all	  be	  visited	  in	  a	  given	  “run”	  of	  the	  
FSA—some	  of	  which	  are	  necessarily	  neglected	  in	  Putnam’s	  construction	  for	  such	  FSA—are	  captured	  
through	  use	  of	  the	  dial.	  Third	  and	  finally,	  the	  clock	  and	  dial	  together	  ensure	  that	  distinct	  inputs	  encoded	  
in	  initial	  FSA	  states	  can	  be	  assigned	  to	  distinct	  FSA	  state	  sequences	  that	  would	  result	  from	  any	  arbitrarily	  
chosen	  FSA	  transition	  table,	  with	  the	  distinguishability	  of	  the	  dial	  states	  precluding	  temporal	  
intersection	  of	  microstate	  trajectories	  (and	  thus	  violation	  of	  P’)	  for	  systems	  with	  inputs	  encoded	  in	  
multiple	  possible	  initial	  states.	  
Chalmers’s	  construction	  is	  still	  not	  as	  general	  as	  we	  might	  like,	  since	  inputs	  can	  only	  be	  encoded	  in	  the	  
initial	  state	  of	  the	  clock-­‐and-­‐dial	  apparatus	  and	  thus	  can	  affect	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  system’s	  state	  only	  
by	  being	  encoded	  in	  the	  system’s	  state.	  But	  it	  does	  unambiguously	  enable	  satisfaction	  of	  P’	  for	  arbitrary	  
FSA	  with	  inputs,	  even	  though	  the	  assignment	  of	  physical	  to	  computational	  states	  is	  otherwise	  just	  as	  ad	  
hoc	  as	  it	  is	  in	  Putnam’s	  construction.	  Regardless	  of	  which	  trajectory	  is	  followed,	  a	  given	  computational	  
state	  evolves	  from	  (into)	  a	  microstate	  that	  corresponds	  to	  its	  predecessor	  (successor)	  computational	  
state,	  as	  required	  by	  P’.	  This	  improves	  significantly	  on	  Putnam’s	  construction	  in	  ways	  that	  suggest	  it	  can	  
provide	  stronger	  support	  for	  unlimited	  PC.	  
However,	  while	  Chalmers’s	  construction	  goes	  beyond	  Putnam’s	  by	  satisfying	  S	  and	  P’	  even	  for	  FSA	  with	  
inputs,	  it	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  S’	  and	  thus—like	  Putnam’s—is	  supported	  only	  under	  weak	  computational	  
descriptions.	  Computational	  states	  do	  correspond	  either	  to	  distinct	  physical	  microstates	  of	  a	  system	  or	  
to	  statistical	  states	  defined	  independently	  on	  disjoint	  regions	  of	  a	  system’s	  state	  space,	  as	  required	  by	  
S’.	  	  As	  in	  Putnam’s	  construction,	  however,	  the	  physical	  microstates	  belonging	  to	  the	  various	  
computational	  states	  contain	  more	  information	  about	  the	  dynamical	  history	  of	  the	  system	  than	  do	  the	  
computational	  states	  themselves.11	  
Chalmers’s	  dial-­‐and-­‐clock	  construction	  thus	  provides	  a	  weak	  computational	  description	  at	  best.	  	  Other	  
authors	  have	  offered	  variants	  of	  Chalmers’s	  construction	  (Brown	  2012,	  Scheutz	  2012).	  They	  are	  more	  
complex	  than	  Chalmers’s	  original	  construction	  in	  that	  they	  employ	  many	  dials	  and	  clocks	  distributed	  
over	  many	  subcomponents	  of	  a	  physical	  system.	  But	  the	  constraints	  they	  impose	  on	  the	  physical	  system	  
are	  essentially	  the	  same.	  Therefore,	  they	  also	  satisfy	  only	  weak	  computational	  descriptions.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Chalmers	  also	  offers	  a	  slightly	  modified	  construction	  for	  input-­‐output	  FSAs.	  He	  claims	  that	  “every	  physical	  
system	  with	  an	  input	  memory	  and	  a	  dial	  implements	  every	  FSA	  with	  the	  right	  input/output	  dependencies”	  (1996,	  
322),	  where	  an	  input	  memory	  is	  a	  subsystem	  that	  goes	  into	  a	  distinct	  state	  for	  every	  possible	  sequence	  of	  inputs.	  
Chalmers	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  the	  correct	  outputs	  are	  supposed	  to	  come	  out	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  process	  that,	  as	  he	  
defines	  is,	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  input	  (or	  input	  memory	  state)	  in	  any	  way;	  in	  fact,	  in	  a	  later	  paper	  he	  points	  out	  




As	  we	  have	  seen,	  examples	  and	  constructions	  that	  motivate	  unlimited	  PC	  are	  supported	  only	  under	  
weak	  computational	  descriptions—descriptions	  that	  set	  a	  low	  bar	  for	  “qualification”	  of	  physical	  states	  
and/or	  processes	  as	  computational	  states	  and	  processes.	  We	  have	  shown	  explicitly	  why	  the	  descriptions	  
that	  support	  them	  are	  weak,	  appealing	  to	  notions	  of	  representational	  faithfulness	  and	  computational	  
fidelity.	  To	  conclude	  our	  discussion	  of	  unlimited	  PC,	  we	  review	  objections	  that	  have	  been	  raised	  in	  the	  
literature	  and	  show	  how	  they	  are	  captured	  and	  made	  precise	  within	  our	  analysis.	  	  	  	  	  
One	  critique	  of	  unlimited	  PC	  is	  that	  the	  mappings	  between	  computational	  and	  physical	  microstates	  it	  
relies	  on	  are	  illegitimate	  because	  they	  are	  constructed	  ex	  post	  facto	  (Copeland	  1996).	  In	  other	  words,	  
given	  these	  mappings,	  the	  work	  of	  generating	  successor	  computational	  states	  or	  outputs	  is	  not	  done	  by	  
the	  physical	  system	  itself	  but	  by	  the	  person	  who	  constructs	  the	  mapping	  relation.	  We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  
position	  to	  see	  exactly	  what	  this	  means.	  Weak	  computational	  descriptions	  may	  be	  weak	  because	  they	  
violate	  P’,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  microphysical	  state	  transitions	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  computational	  
dynamics.	  But	  weak	  computational	  descriptions	  may	  also	  be	  weak	  because	  they	  violate	  S’,	  which	  means	  
they	  contain	  too	  much	  information—information	  about	  specific	  predecessor	  computational	  states	  of	  a	  
physical	  microstate	  that	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  computational	  description.	  	  
Another	  critique	  of	  unlimited	  PC	  is	  that	  the	  mappings	  invoked	  by	  unlimited	  PC	  violate	  the	  counterfactual	  
relations	  that	  must	  obtain	  between	  the	  computational	  states	  (Chalmers	  1995,	  1996,	  Copeland	  1996).	  
This	  observation	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  counterfactual	  account	  of	  computation.	  We	  can	  now	  make	  more	  
precise	  what	  is	  right	  about	  this	  objection.	  As	  we’ve	  seen,	  unlimited	  PC	  requires	  weak	  computational	  
descriptions,	  and	  weak	  computational	  descriptions	  fail	  to	  support	  only	  and	  all	  of	  the	  right	  
counterfactuals	  between	  computational	  states.	  Specifically,	  descriptions	  that	  violate	  P’	  fail	  to	  support	  
the	  counterfactual	  relations	  encoded	  in	  the	  transition	  rules	  {(C,I)àC’}	  and	  descriptions	  that	  violate	  S’	  
support	  counterfactuals	  not	  encoded	  in	  these	  rules.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  even	  descriptions	  that	  have	  been	  
claimed	  to	  support	  the	  right	  counterfactuals—such	  as	  Chalmers’s	  dial-­‐and-­‐clock	  construction	  (which	  
satisfies	  P’)—can	  in	  fact	  fail	  to	  support	  the	  only	  and	  all	  of	  the	  right	  counterfactuals	  by	  violating	  S’.	  
Descriptions	  that	  violate	  S’	  support	  counterfactuals	  they	  should	  not	  support—namely,	  counterfactuals	  
from	  specific	  microstates	  corresponding	  to	  one	  and	  the	  same	  computational	  state	  to	  specific	  
predecessor	  states,	  counterfactuals	  that	  are	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  transition	  rules	  {(C,I)àC’}.	  
Another	  popular	  response	  to	  unlimited	  pancomputationalism	  is	  that	  its	  mappings	  fail	  to	  construct	  an	  
isomorphism	  between	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  physical	  system	  and	  the	  state	  transitions	  specified	  by	  
the	  computational	  description,	  and	  non-­‐causal	  mappings	  are	  illegitimate	  (Chrisley	  1995,	  Chalmers	  1995,	  
1996,	  2011,	  Scheutz	  1999,	  2001).	  This	  objection	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  causal	  account	  of	  computation,	  
according	  to	  which	  acceptable	  mappings	  must	  respect	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  a	  system.	  Indeed,	  weak	  
descriptions	  either	  fail	  to	  mirror	  the	  causal	  structure	  encoded	  in	  the	  computational	  state	  transitions	  (if	  it	  
violates	  P’),	  or	  it	  contains	  too	  much	  causal	  structure	  (if	  it	  violates	  S’).	  As	  we	  have	  argued	  above,	  in	  order	  
to	  capture	  all	  and	  only	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  a	  system	  that	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  computational	  state	  
transitions,	  a	  description	  must	  satisfy	  both	  S’	  and	  P’—that	  is,	  it	  must	  be	  robust.	  Thus,	  robustness	  is	  a	  
more	  precise	  and	  adequate	  replacement	  of	  the	  causal	  account	  of	  computation.	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Yet	  another	  response	  to	  unlimited	  pancomputationalism	  is	  implicitly	  given	  by	  Godfrey-­‐Smith	  (2009).	  
Although	  Godfrey-­‐Smith	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  functionalism	  as	  opposed	  to	  computation	  per	  se,	  
his	  argument	  is	  relevant	  here.	  Godfrey-­‐Smith	  argues	  that	  for	  a	  mapping	  to	  constitute	  a	  genuine	  
implementation,	  the	  physical	  microstates	  that	  are	  clustered	  together	  (to	  constitute	  a	  given	  
computational	  state)	  must	  be	  physically	  similar	  to	  one	  another—there	  cannot	  be	  arbitrary	  groupings	  of	  
arbitrarily	  different	  physical	  states.	  Godfrey-­‐Smith	  suggests	  that	  his	  similarity	  restriction	  on	  legitimate	  
mappings	  may	  be	  complemented	  by	  the	  kind	  of	  causal	  and	  localization	  restrictions	  proposed	  by	  
Chalmers	  (1996).	  Our	  faithfulness	  and	  fidelity	  conditions	  quantify	  and	  make	  precise	  the	  similarity	  that	  is	  
needed	  to	  make	  Godfrey-­‐Smith’s	  argument	  go	  through.	  The	  similarity	  between	  microstates	  must	  be	  
such	  as	  to	  satisfy	  P’,	  but	  the	  microstates	  must	  not	  be	  so	  similar	  as	  to	  violate	  S’.	  Thus,	  our	  fidelity	  and	  
faithfulness	  conditions	  make	  more	  precise	  and	  capture	  what	  is	  right	  about	  the	  counterfactual,	  causal,	  
and	  similarity-­‐based	  accounts	  of	  computation.	  
In	  summary,	  we	  have	  offered	  a	  more	  precise	  account	  of	  where	  unlimited	  PC	  goes	  astray.	  Unlimited	  PC	  
relies	  on	  mappings	  between	  computational	  and	  physical	  descriptions	  that	  lack	  faithfulness,	  fidelity,	  or	  
both.	  We	  can	  now	  tackle	  limited	  PC.	  
3(b).	  	  Limited	  PC	  
	  
The	  weak	  version	  of	  pancomputationalism	  is	  limited	  PC.	  
Limited	  PC	   Every	  physical	  system	  objectively	  performs	  at	  least	  one	  computation.	  
Limited	  PC	  is	  weaker	  than	  its	  unlimited	  namesake.	  It	  holds	  that	  every	  physical	  system	  performs	  at	  least	  
one	  computation,	  which	  may	  be	  labeled	  in	  different	  ways	  and	  may	  encode	  other	  (similarly	  or	  less	  
complex)	  computations,	  or	  a	  small	  number	  of	  nonequivalent	  computations	  that	  satisfy	  appropriate	  
conditions.	  Exponents	  of	  limited	  PC	  (e.g.,	  Chalmers	  1996,	  331,	  Scheutz	  1999,	  191)	  usually	  reject	  
unlimited	  PC	  and	  maintain	  that	  although	  every	  physical	  system	  performs	  some	  computation,	  which	  
computation	  is	  performed	  by	  which	  physical	  system	  is	  an	  objective	  matter	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  
properties	  of	  the	  system	  such	  as	  its	  causal	  structure	  at	  an	  appropriate	  level	  of	  abstraction.	  
One	  reason	  given	  for	  limited	  PC	  is	  that	  everything	  has	  causal	  structure.	  According	  to	  some,	  computation	  
is	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  physical	  processes	  at	  some	  level	  of	  abstraction	  (Chrisley	  1995,	  Chalmers	  1995,	  
1996,	  Scheutz	  1999,	  2001).	  If	  every	  physical	  system	  has	  causal	  structure,	  it	  follows	  that	  every	  physical	  
system	  performs	  the	  computation	  constituted	  by	  its	  causal	  structure.	  This	  is	  causal	  limited	  PC.	  
Some	  people	  reject	  the	  notion	  of	  causation	  as	  non-­‐fundamental	  and	  dispensable	  from	  fundamental	  
physics	  (e.g.,	  Norton	  2003).	  But	  qualms	  about	  causation	  are	  not	  a	  reason	  against	  limited	  PC.	  Causation	  
skeptics	  can	  recover	  an	  analogue	  of	  causal	  pancomputationalism	  by	  formulating	  an	  argument	  for	  limited	  
PC	  in	  terms	  they	  like—e.g.,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  dynamical	  properties	  of	  physical	  systems.	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Another	  alleged	  reason	  for	  limited	  PC	  is	  that	  every	  physical	  state	  carries	  information	  combined	  with	  the	  
popular	  view	  that	  computation	  is	  information-­‐processing.	  It	  follows	  that	  every	  physical	  system	  performs	  
the	  computations	  constituted	  by	  the	  manipulation	  of	  its	  information-­‐carrying	  states	  (cf.	  Shagrir	  2006,	  
Milkowski	  2013).	  The	  view	  that	  computation	  is	  information-­‐processing	  remains	  controversial.12	  	  
Unlike	  unlimited	  PC,	  limited	  PC	  does	  not	  trivialize	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  physical	  system	  is	  computational	  
completely.	  Different	  systems	  generally	  have	  different	  objective	  properties;	  thus,	  according	  to	  limited	  
pancomputationalism,	  different	  systems	  generally	  perform	  different	  computations.	  Computer	  scientists	  
and	  engineers	  would	  overwhelmingly	  agree	  with	  this	  aspect	  of	  limited	  PC	  and	  would	  go	  even	  further,	  
taking	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  relatively	  few	  physical	  systems—mostly	  those	  of	  their	  deliberate	  creation—
perform	  computations.	  By	  contrast,	  limited	  PC	  maintains	  that	  the	  digital	  computers	  created	  by	  
computer	  scientists	  and	  engineers	  through	  enormous	  investments	  of	  ingenuity	  and	  labor	  perform	  
computations	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  in	  which	  rocks,	  hurricanes,	  and	  planetary	  systems	  do—because	  they	  all	  
have	  causal	  structure	  or	  because	  they	  all	  process	  information.	  	  
	  
Limited	  PC	  is	  Supported	  Only	  Under	  Robust	  Computational	  Descriptions	  (At	  Best)	  
We	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  limited	  PC	  is	  supported	  only	  under	  robust	  computational	  descriptions	  because	  it	  
requires	  satisfaction	  of	  S’	  and	  P’	  but	  cannot	  satisfy	  U.	  Before	  showing	  this,	  we	  need	  to	  set	  aside	  a	  trivial	  
version	  of	  limited	  PC.	  
According	  to	  trivial	  limited	  PC,	  every	  physical	  system	  objectively	  performs	  some	  computation	  no	  matter	  
how	  trivial	  that	  computation	  may	  be.	  For	  example,	  consider	  an	  ordinary	  toaster	  initially	  holding	  an	  
untoasted	  piece	  of	  bread.	  Take	  the	  slider	  to	  be	  one	  input	  (“up”	  encoding	  0	  and	  “down”	  encoding	  1),	  the	  
electrical	  plug	  to	  be	  another	  input	  (“unplugged”	  encoding	  0	  and	  “plugged	  in”	  encoding	  1),	  and	  the	  state	  
of	  the	  bread	  to	  be	  the	  output	  (“untoasted”	  for	  0	  and	  “toasted”	  for	  1),	  all	  defined	  at	  “computationally	  
relevant”	  times.	  The	  toaster	  computes	  the	  AND	  function	  –	  or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  two-­‐input,	  one-­‐output	  
Boolean	  function	  that	  can	  be	  obtained	  by	  relabeling	  the	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  of	  the	  AND	  function	  –	  since	  
the	  slider	  has	  to	  be	  depressed	  and	  the	  toaster	  has	  to	  be	  plugged	  in	  if	  toasted	  bread	  is	  to	  result.	  But	  the	  
two-­‐input	  AND	  is	  a	  trivial	  computation	  with	  only	  two	  inputs	  and	  one	  output.	  If	  this	  kind	  of	  trivial	  
computation	  is	  accepted,	  then	  limited	  PC	  is	  supported	  even	  under	  strong	  computational	  descriptions	  at	  
least	  for	  any	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  that	  can	  be	  prepared	  and	  observed	  by	  users.	  	  	  
This	  being	  said,	  we	  will	  set	  trivial	  limited	  PC	  aside.	  Claims	  that,	  in	  the	  above	  sense,	  a	  toaster	  implements	  
the	  AND	  function,	  a	  switch	  implements	  the	  NOT	  function,	  a	  coin	  sitting	  on	  a	  table	  implements	  the	  
identity	  function	  —	  that	  any	  system	  implements	  some	  function	  of	  similarly	  low	  complexity—	  would	  be	  
unimpressive,	  even	  if	  they	  held	  up	  under	  the	  harshest	  scrutiny.	  We	  should	  not	  be	  surprised	  that	  
processes	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  our	  complex	  universe	  with	  causal	  structures	  coinciding	  with	  those	  of	  
elementary,	  abstract	  mappings	  that	  we	  call	  computational	  primitives,	  and	  should	  not	  make	  too	  much	  of	  
it.	  We	  could	  find	  many	  examples	  of	  common	  objects	  that	  objectively	  implement	  trivial	  computational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The	  present	  authors’	  perspectives	  on	  this	  question	  are	  provided	  in	  (Anderson	  2016b)	  and	  (Piccinini	  2015).	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primitives	  (like	  the	  toaster	  AND	  gate),	  but	  would	  be	  much	  harder	  pressed	  to	  identify	  objects	  that	  
implement	  nontrivial	  computations	  (like	  a	  tree	  stump	  or	  garden	  trowel	  that	  performs	  image	  
compression).	  From	  now	  on,	  we	  thus	  consider	  only	  nontrivial	  versions	  of	  limited	  PC,	  according	  to	  which	  
every	  physical	  system	  performs	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  nontrivial	  computations.	  	  	  
We	  will	  now	  argue	  that	  (nontrivial)	  limited	  PC	  violates	  U;	  therefore,	  it	  requires	  computational	  
descriptions	  that	  are	  at	  most	  robust	  (as	  opposed	  to	  strong).	  We	  begin	  by	  assuming	  the	  opposite	  of	  our	  
conclusion:	  an	  arbitrary	  physical	  system	  computes	  nontrivial	  function	  f:	  I	  -­‐>	  O	  so	  that	  the	  system	  may	  be	  
used	  to	  evaluate	  f	  for	  arguments	  of	  an	  agent’s	  choosing.	  We	  also	  assume	  that,	  if	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  
nontrivial	  function	  f:	  I	  -­‐>	  O	  computed	  by	  the	  system,	  we	  can	  then	  construct	  a	  robust	  computational	  
description	  of	  the	  system,	  that	  is,	  a	  computational	  description	  that	  satisfies	  S’	  and	  P’.	  	  
These	  assumptions	  are	  highly	  nontrivial.	  First,	  satisfying	  both	  S’	  and	  P’	  requires	  specific	  properties	  that	  
go	  beyond	  simply	  possessing	  causal	  structure	  or	  processing	  physical	  information.	  Thus,	  it	  takes	  more	  
than	  the	  standard	  reasons	  given	  by	  supporters	  of	  limited	  PC	  to	  identify	  objective	  computations	  in	  any	  
physical	  system.	  Second,	  that	  an	  arbitrary	  physical	  system	  performs	  nontrivial	  computations	  is	  dubious	  
and	  remains	  to	  be	  shown.	  Thus,	  we	  are	  far	  from	  assuming	  that	  limited	  PC	  is	  true.	  But	  we	  need	  to	  assume	  
that	  both	  S’	  and	  P’	  are	  satisfied	  so	  that	  the	  system’s	  putative	  computations	  are	  “objective”	  in	  the	  sense	  
of	  having	  robust	  physical	  implementations.	  We	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  even	  an	  arbitrary	  system	  that	  satisfies	  
these	  assumptions	  still	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  U	  and	  thus	  its	  computations	  are	  not	  usable.	  	  
Select	  an	  arbitrary	  physical	  system	  S.	  We	  wish	  to	  identify	  the	  function	  f	  computed	  by	  S.	  To	  do	  that,	  we	  
need	  to	  identify	  S’s	  inputs	  and	  outputs.	  As	  we	  pointed	  out	  above,	  inputs	  may	  be	  identified	  either	  with	  
influences	  that	  enter	  a	  system	  as	  it	  is	  evolving	  or	  with	  “initial”	  states.	  Similarly,	  outputs	  may	  be	  either	  
signals	  that	  exit	  the	  system	  as	  it	  evolves	  or	  “final”	  states.	  We	  will	  now	  list	  challenges	  that	  make	  it	  hard	  or	  
impossible	  to	  identify	  a	  strong	  computational	  description	  (i.e.,	  one	  that	  satisfies	  U	  and	  therefore	  makes	  
the	  computation	  usable).	  	  
A	  first	  challenge	  is	  that	  all	  relevant	  features	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  (states,	  external	  influences,	  and	  signals	  
from	  the	  system)	  can	  be	  described	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  granularity.	  They	  can	  be	  described	  at	  different	  
temporal	  and	  spatial	  scales,	  more	  finely	  or	  more	  coarsely.	  So,	  no	  matter	  how	  we	  choose	  the	  inputs	  and	  
outputs,	  there	  are	  indefinitely	  many	  possible	  descriptions	  of	  the	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  and,	  corresponding	  
to	  those,	  indefinitely	  many	  functions	  putatively	  computed	  by	  the	  system.	  	  
The	  cleanest	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  would	  be	  to	  identify	  the	  fundamental	  physical	  level	  (if	  there	  is	  
one)	  and	  define	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  at	  that	  level.	  This	  is	  the	  solution	  pursued	  by	  ontic	  PC	  (more	  on	  this	  in	  
Section	  3(c)).	  But	  this	  solution	  won’t	  work	  for	  present	  purposes	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  we	  don’t	  know	  
what	  the	  fundamental	  physical	  level	  is.	  Second,	  given	  our	  current	  technology	  we	  have	  no	  direct	  way	  to	  
manipulate	  the	  fundamental	  physical	  level	  to	  select	  arbitrary	  values	  on	  which	  to	  evaluate	  f	  and	  observe	  
the	  results	  of	  the	  putative	  computation.	  Therefore,	  we	  need	  to	  operate	  at	  a	  nonfundamental	  physical	  
level.	  But	  there	  are	  many	  of	  those,	  and	  it’s	  not	  clear	  which	  one	  we	  should	  choose.	  Let’s	  pick	  an	  arbitrary	  
level	  L.	  From	  now	  on,	  the	  function	  putatively	  computed	  by	  our	  system	  S	  is	  relative	  to	  level	  L.	  (At	  levels	  
different	  from	  L,	  the	  system	  may	  compute	  different	  functions.)	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A	  second	  challenge	  is	  that	  most	  systems	  are	  out	  of	  our	  reach.	  They	  are	  too	  big,	  too	  small,	  too	  distant	  in	  
space,	  too	  far	  in	  the	  past	  or	  future,	  or	  insufficiently	  understood	  for	  us	  to	  observe	  and	  manipulate	  their	  
inputs	  and	  outputs,	  which	  we	  must	  do	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  function	  they	  putatively	  compute	  on	  
arguments	  of	  our	  choosing.	  Therefore,	  we	  need	  to	  restrict	  our	  attention	  to	  systems	  that	  are	  within	  our	  
reach.	  
A	  third	  challenge	  is	  that	  there	  are	  indefinitely	  many	  computational	  formalisms	  which	  we	  could	  use	  to	  
define	  f.	  Any	  given	  formalism	  (finite-­‐state	  automata,	  cellular	  automata,	  register	  machines,	  etc.)	  gives	  
rise	  to	  different	  computational	  descriptions	  of	  f.	  For	  present	  purposes,	  we	  will	  stick	  with	  finite-­‐state	  
automata	  as	  our	  canonical	  computational	  description.	  
A	  fourth	  challenge	  is	  that	  in	  an	  arbitrary	  physical	  system,	  there	  is	  no	  well-­‐defined	  distinction	  between	  
computationally	  relevant	  degrees	  of	  freedom—those	  constituting	  the	  inputs,	  internal	  states,	  and	  
outputs	  of	  the	  computation—and	  computationally	  irrelevant	  degrees	  of	  freedom,	  including	  those	  
pertaining	  to	  the	  inflow	  of	  energy	  into	  the	  system,	  outflow	  of	  heat	  from	  the	  system,	  and	  any	  other	  
arbitrary	  influences	  on	  the	  system	  and	  its	  dynamics.	  For	  instance,	  consider	  a	  falling	  leaf	  again.	  Are	  the	  
air	  currents	  that	  push	  it	  around	  inputs	  to	  a	  computational	  system	  or	  random	  disturbances	  to	  its	  
computational	  dynamics?	  Depending	  on	  how	  we	  answer	  this	  question,	  we	  end	  up	  with	  radically	  
different	  computational	  descriptions.	  And	  regardless	  of	  how	  we	  answer	  this	  question,	  air	  currents	  are	  
probably	  too	  disorderly	  to	  be	  captured	  in	  a	  perspicuous	  computational	  description,	  such	  that	  it	  is	  clear	  
which	  argument	  of	  which	  function	  is	  being	  computed	  by	  the	  system	  and	  which	  step	  of	  the	  computation	  
is	  being	  performed	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  A	  clean	  way	  around	  this	  challenge	  is	  to	  take	  the	  whole	  universe	  to	  
be	  the	  computing	  system	  (more	  on	  this	  below).	  When	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  universe	  is	  considered,	  
however,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clean	  boundary	  between	  an	  arbitrary	  system’s	  putative	  computational	  structure	  
and	  other	  factors	  is	  a	  serious	  challenge.	  
This	  leads	  to	  our	  fifth	  and	  perhaps	  greatest	  challenge:	  (nontrivial)	  dynamical	  descriptions	  of	  arbitrary	  
physical	  systems	  are	  not	  exact	  but	  approximate	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  microstates	  of	  a	  
system	  can	  be	  measured	  and	  specified	  only	  with	  finite	  precision,	  so	  that	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  between	  what	  a	  
microphysical	  description	  says	  and	  what	  the	  system	  does.	  Secondly,	  some	  aspect	  of	  the	  system’s	  
dynamics	  may	  be	  unknown,	  which	  enlarges	  the	  gap.	  Thirdly,	  including	  every	  known	  factor	  in	  the	  
microphysical	  description	  of	  an	  arbitrary	  system	  (from	  which	  the	  computational	  description	  is	  to	  be	  
constructed)	  typically	  makes	  the	  model	  mathematically	  or	  computationally	  intractable.	  Because	  of	  this,	  
typical	  microphysical	  descriptions	  incorporate	  simplifications	  and	  idealizations,	  which	  may	  further	  
enlarge	  the	  gap	  between	  what	  the	  microphysical	  description	  says	  and	  what	  the	  system	  does.	  Fourthly,	  
accuracy	  in	  representing	  the	  dynamics	  of	  a	  system	  requires	  computational	  resources.	  The	  more	  accuracy	  
is	  desired,	  the	  more	  resources	  are	  needed.	  Since	  computational	  resources	  are	  always	  finite,	  this	  
introduces	  a	  further	  gap	  between	  what	  a	  microphysical	  description	  says	  and	  what	  the	  system	  does.	  
Fifth,	  typical	  deterministic	  dynamics	  are	  nonlinear,	  and	  typical	  nonlinear	  dynamics	  are	  so	  sensitive	  that	  
the	  system’s	  actual	  dynamical	  evolution	  diverges	  exponentially	  from	  any	  dynamical	  description	  based	  
on	  a	  finite	  specification	  of	  the	  system.	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The	  approximate	  nature	  of	  ordinary	  dynamical	  descriptions,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  sharp	  
boundary	  between	  putative	  computational	  structure	  and	  external	  influences	  on	  an	  arbitrary	  (nontrivial)	  
system,	  have	  a	  dire	  consequence:	  even	  if	  we	  succeeded	  in	  constructing	  a	  robust	  computational	  
description	  of	  an	  arbitrary	  physical	  system	  as	  computing	  nontrivial	  function	  f,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  we	  would	  
be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  use	  the	  system	  to	  evaluate	  f	  for	  arguments	  of	  our	  choosing	  with	  any	  reliability.	  This	  is	  
because,	  even	  if	  we	  could	  observe	  or	  prepare	  the	  system	  as	  being	  in	  a	  desired	  initial	  state	  I,	  we	  have	  no	  
guarantee	  that	  the	  gap	  between	  our	  description	  and	  the	  actual	  behavior	  of	  the	  system,	  plus	  any	  other	  
disturbances,	  would	  lead	  the	  system	  to	  yield	  the	  desired	  value	  O.	  
In	  conclusion,	  nontrivial	  limited	  PC	  is	  less	  compelling	  than	  it	  may	  have	  seemed.	  Even	  if	  we	  set	  aside	  the	  
difficulties	  with	  identifying	  nontrivial	  robust	  computational	  descriptions	  of	  an	  arbitrary	  physical	  system	  
such	  that	  the	  system	  computes	  function	  f,	  in	  general	  it	  is	  extremely	  unlikely	  that	  we	  could	  ever	  use	  the	  
system	  to	  evaluate	  f	  for	  desired	  arguments.	  It	  takes	  a	  lot	  of	  careful	  regimentation	  for	  a	  system	  to	  let	  a	  
user	  evaluate	  a	  function	  reliably.	  It	  takes	  regimentation	  in	  how	  the	  microstates	  are	  clustered,	  in	  how	  
they	  transition	  over	  time,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  shielding	  the	  relevant	  state	  transitions	  from	  external	  
disturbances.	  Most	  systems	  lack	  this	  regimentation.	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  systems	  that	  are	  not	  evolved	  or	  
designed	  and	  built	  for	  computation	  will	  possess	  the	  exquisitely	  fine-­‐tuned	  regimented	  structure	  that	  
would	  allow	  them	  to	  perform	  nontrivial	  computations	  reliably.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  possibility	  
that	  some	  artificial	  or	  natural	  systems—systems	  not	  commonly	  regarded	  as	  “computational”—may	  
indeed	  possess	  this	  regimentation,	  which	  workers	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  unconventional	  and	  natural	  
computation	  seek	  to	  discover	  and	  even	  utilize.	  But	  the	  nontrivial	  limited	  pancomputationalist’s	  burden	  
is	  to	  show	  that	  any	  sufficiently	  complex	  physical	  system	  performs	  one	  or	  more	  nontrivial	  computations.	  	  
This	  burden	  has	  not	  been	  met.	  	  	  
	  
Universe	  as	  a	  Computing	  System	  within	  Limited	  PC	  
Further	  questions	  arise	  about	  the	  strength	  of	  supporting	  computational	  descriptions	  for	  limited	  PC	  when	  
we	  consider	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  whole	  universe	  computes.	  This	  notion	  is	  natural	  for	  ontic	  
pancomputationalists,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Sec.	  3(c),	  but	  the	  notion	  can	  and	  should	  be	  considered	  
independently	  of	  ontic	  PC	  since	  all	  forms	  of	  pancomputationalism	  are	  supposed	  to	  apply	  to	  all	  physical	  
systems.	  We	  could	  do	  this	  by	  taking	  those	  microstates	  of	  the	  universe	  that	  have	  been	  visited	  so	  far	  to	  be	  
computational	  states,	  the	  transitions	  between	  these	  states	  to	  have	  been	  governed	  by	  the	  evolution	  of	  
the	  universe,	  and	  the	  “function”	  computed	  by	  the	  universe	  to	  be	  its	  own	  evolution.	  Such	  a	  claim	  would	  
belong	  to	  limited	  PC,	  but	  not	  unlimited	  PC	  (since	  only	  one	  computation	  is	  claimed	  for	  the	  system)	  and	  
not	  ontic	  PC	  (since	  a	  mapping	  between	  physical	  and	  computational	  states	  is	  involved,	  rather	  than	  the	  
claim	  that	  they	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  or	  are	  on	  an	  equal	  footing).	  We	  now	  consider	  computational	  
states,	  computational	  processes,	  and	  usability	  for	  the	  universe-­‐as-­‐a-­‐computing-­‐system,	  and	  assess	  the	  
implications	  for	  limited	  PC.	  For	  consistency,	  this	  discussion	  assumes	  a	  classical,	  causal,	  globally	  closed,	  




Selection	  of	  the	  past	  microstates	  of	  the	  universe	  as	  the	  computational	  states	  of	  the	  "universe-­‐as-­‐a-­‐
computing	  system"	  is	  the	  only	  objective	  choice	  for	  these	  states,	  as	  a	  computation	  constructed	  from	  the	  
sequence	  of	  these	  states	  that	  has	  been	  carved	  out	  in	  the	  universe's	  past	  history	  would	  encode	  any	  
computation	  constructed	  from	  any	  disjunction	  or	  coarse	  graining	  of	  these	  states.	  Thus,	  no	  statistics	  are	  
involved	  in	  mapping	  statistical	  physical	  states	  to	  computational	  states	  and	  the	  stronger	  condition	  S'	  on	  
computational	  states	  is	  trivially	  supported.	  
The	  stronger	  condition	  P'	  on	  computational	  processes	  is	  also	  supported,	  but	  also	  trivially.	  Assuming	  that	  
there	  is	  one	  universe	  with	  a	  unique	  history,	  no	  universe	  microstate	  -­‐	  and	  thus	  no	  computational	  state	  -­‐	  
has	  been	  visited	  more	  than	  once.	  Construction	  of	  any	  computation	  from	  this	  sequence	  of	  states	  can	  thus	  
have	  no	  branching,	  and	  is	  analogous	  to	  a	  non-­‐cyclic,	  inputless	  FSA.	  P'	  is	  easily	  satisfied	  for	  this	  case.	  	  	  
One	  could	  argue	  that,	  if	  the	  universe	  is	  governed	  by	  causal	  physical	  laws,	  we	  need	  not	  be	  restricted	  to	  a	  
computational	  description	  constructed	  solely	  from	  the	  universe's	  history.	  We	  could	  use	  these	  physical	  
laws	  to	  build	  more	  complex	  computational	  descriptions	  of	  the	  universe-­‐as-­‐a-­‐computing-­‐system	  that	  
accommodate	  the	  possibility	  of	  inputs	  and	  computational	  branching,	  with	  causal	  properties	  and	  
counterfactual	  robustness	  underwritten	  by	  regularities	  described	  by	  these	  laws.	  It	  is	  not	  clear,	  however,	  
what	  could	  possibly	  count	  as	  an	  "input"	  to	  the	  universe	  as	  a	  whole,	  at	  least	  with	  the	  common	  
conception	  of	  an	  input	  as	  an	  external	  influence.	  Any	  input	  that	  is	  somehow	  "internal"	  to	  the	  system	  is	  
necessarily	  reflected	  in	  the	  complete	  specification	  of	  the	  system’s	  state,	  and	  everything	  in	  the	  universe	  
is	  by	  definition	  internal	  to	  the	  universe.	  Paradoxically,	  if	  the	  computation	  implemented	  throughout	  the	  
universe's	  history	  is	  indeed	  without	  inputs,	  it	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  a	  trivial	  (if	  long)	  computation.	  
The	  usability	  criterion	  also	  takes	  on	  a	  different	  light	  when	  the	  universe	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  
computing	  system.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  an	  "agent"	  can	  be	  defined	  
that	  is	  not	  internal	  to	  the	  universe.	  While	  we	  are	  living	  proof	  that	  internal	  agents	  do	  exist,	  our	  relevance	  
to	  the	  universe-­‐as-­‐a-­‐computing-­‐system	  is	  limited	  since	  the	  computing	  systems	  we	  use	  are	  subsystems	  of	  
the	  universe	  (such	  as	  laptop	  computers)	  and	  not	  the	  universe	  as	  a	  whole.	  Second,	  even	  if	  an	  external	  
agent	  can	  be	  defined,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  it	  would	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  they	  use	  the	  universe-­‐as-­‐a-­‐
computing-­‐system	  to	  evaluate	  the	  universe-­‐function	  for	  an	  argument	  of	  their	  choice.	  If	  such	  a	  function	  
could,	  in	  principle,	  be	  identified,	  and	  if	  we	  allow	  that	  an	  argument	  was	  encoded	  in	  the	  initial	  state	  of	  the	  
universe	  (since	  there	  are	  no	  external	  influences),	  then	  the	  function	  is	  (or	  is	  being)	  evaluated	  for	  one	  and	  
only	  one	  argument.	  There	  is	  no	  chance	  of	  evaluating	  it	  for	  another	  argument	  without	  reenacting	  the	  
entire	  history	  of	  the	  universe	  with	  different	  initial	  conditions.	  	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  consideration	  of	  the	  universe	  as	  a	  computing	  system	  upholds	  the	  above	  conclusion	  -­‐	  that	  
the	  robustness	  condition	  (S'	  and	  P'),	  but	  not	  the	  usability	  condition	  U,	  are	  supported	  by	  limited	  PC	  -­‐	  but	  
only	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  S'	  and	  P'	  are	  trivially	  satisfied	  and	  U	  goes	  unsatisfied	  because	  it	  is	  of	  dubious	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Some	  authors—mostly	  physicists—argue	  that	  the	  physical	  universe	  is	  fundamentally	  computational.	  It’s	  
not	  just	  that	  the	  universe	  itself	  is	  a	  computing	  system	  and	  everything	  in	  it	  is	  a	  computing	  system	  too,	  
which	  is	  limited	  PC.	  It’s	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  level	  of	  physical	  reality	  at	  which	  the	  one	  and	  only	  
fundamental	  computation	  performed	  by	  each	  physical	  system	  can	  be	  identified.	  In	  addition,	  that	  
fundamental	  computation	  is	  all	  there	  is	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  physical	  system.	  	  	  
An	  alternative	  formulation	  is	  that	  information	  is	  what	  makes	  up	  the	  universe.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  first	  
formulation	  typically	  think	  of	  computational	  states	  as	  bearers	  of	  information,	  and	  proponents	  of	  the	  
second	  formulation	  typically	  think	  of	  information	  dynamics	  as	  computations.	  Since	  typical	  proponents	  of	  
ontic	  PC	  think	  of	  computation	  as	  information	  processing	  and	  vice	  versa,	  then,	  the	  two	  formulations	  are	  
roughly	  interchangeable	  for	  present	  purposes.	  We	  will	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  computational	  formulation	  of	  
ontic	  PC—as	  opposed	  to	  the	  informational	  formulation—and	  define:	  
Ontic	  PC	   Every	  physical	  system	  objectively	  performs	  one	  computation,	  which	  exhausts	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  physical	  system.	  
Ontic	  PC	  includes	  both	  an	  empirical	  claim	  and	  a	  metaphysical	  one.	  	  The	  empirical	  claim	  is	  that	  
fundamental	  physical	  magnitudes	  and	  their	  state	  transitions	  are	  exactly	  and	  exhaustively	  describable	  by	  
an	  appropriate	  computational	  formalism—without	  the	  approximations	  that	  are	  ubiquitous	  in	  standard	  
computational	  descriptions	  of	  physical	  systems.	  This	  empirical	  claim	  takes	  different	  shapes	  depending	  
on	  which	  computational	  formalism	  is	  assumed	  to	  describe	  the	  universe	  exactly.	  We	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  
the	  two	  most	  widely	  held	  forms	  of	  ontic	  PC	  are	  “digital	  ontic	  PC”	  based	  on	  cellular	  automata—	  a	  
classical	  computational	  formalism—and	  “quantum	  ontic	  PC”	  rooted	  in	  quantum	  computing.	  	  The	  
metaphysical	  claim	  of	  ontic	  PC	  is	  that	  computation	  is	  what	  makes	  up	  the	  physical	  universe.	  This	  point	  is	  
sometimes	  made	  by	  saying	  that,	  at	  the	  most	  fundamental	  physical	  level,	  there	  are	  brute	  differences	  
between	  states—nothing	  more	  need	  or	  can	  be	  said	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  states.	  This	  claim	  requires	  
elucidation.	  Before	  we	  get	  to	  that,	  we	  will	  discuss	  the	  empirical	  component	  of	  ontic	  PC.	  
Ontic	  PC	  sidesteps	  the	  requirements	  of	  computational	  description.	  	  Specifically,	  by	  reducing	  the	  physical	  
to	  the	  computational,	  ontic	  PC	  resists	  rigorous	  classification	  via	  the	  criteria	  we	  use	  in	  this	  work	  to	  gauge	  
the	  strength	  of	  the	  underlying	  computational	  description	  required	  for	  its	  support.	  These	  criteria	  are	  
germane	  to	  presumed	  distinctions	  between	  physical	  description	  and	  computational	  description	  that	  are	  
not	  recognized	  in	  ontic	  PC.	  	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  rather	  different	  considerations	  must	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  
detailed	  evaluation	  of	  ontic	  PC,	  and	  we	  provide	  such	  an	  evaluation	  in	  (Piccinini	  and	  Anderson	  2017).	  	  
That	  said,	  we	  note	  that	  ontic	  PC—in	  both	  the	  classical-­‐digital	  and	  quantum	  —is	  most	  closely	  associated	  
with	  limited	  PC:	  the	  computational	  descriptions	  posited	  by	  ontic	  PC	  are	  stronger	  than	  weak	  
computational	  descriptions	  because	  they	  objectively	  assign	  a	  unique	  computational	  trajectory	  to	  every	  
possible	  dynamical	  evolution	  of	  the	  universe,	  but,	  by	  erasing	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  computing	  
system	  and	  an	  agent	  that	  would	  employ	  it	  to	  evaluate	  a	  function,	  they	  cannot	  satisfy	  the	  usability	  





In	  this	  work,	  we	  have	  characterized	  three	  different	  versions	  of	  pancomputationalism	  (PC)—unlimited	  
PC,	  limited	  PC,	  and	  ontic	  PC—in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  computational	  descriptions	  
required	  to	  support	  them.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  distinguished	  three	  classes	  of	  computational	  description	  that	  
reflect	  distinct	  views	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  physical	  microstates	  and	  computational	  states,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  physical	  dynamics	  and	  computational	  state	  transitions,	  and	  the	  usability	  of	  
physical	  systems	  for	  computation	  by	  agents.	  
Weak	  computational	  descriptions	  admit	  mappings	  between	  computational	  states	  and	  physical	  
microstates	  that	  lack	  robustness,	  i.e.	  mappings	  that	  allow	  physical	  microstates	  to	  embody	  either	  more	  
or	  less	  information	  about	  the	  computational	  history	  (i.e.	  previous	  computational	  states)	  of	  a	  system	  
than	  is	  embodied	  in	  the	  computational	  states	  themselves.	  	  
Robust	  computational	  descriptions	  require	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  about	  a	  system’s	  dynamical	  
history	  that	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  physical	  microstates	  is	  identical	  to	  that	  encoded	  in	  the	  computational	  
states,	  but	  not	  that	  the	  system	  is	  usable	  by	  an	  external	  agent	  to	  evaluate	  a	  function	  for	  arguments	  of	  the	  
agent’s	  choice.	  
Finally,	  strong	  computational	  descriptions	  are	  robust	  and	  are	  usable	  by	  an	  agent	  to	  evaluate	  a	  function	  
for	  arguments	  of	  the	  agent’s	  choice.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  strong	  computational	  descriptions	  apply	  to	  the	  
digital	  computing	  devices	  that	  we	  buy,	  sell,	  and	  use	  every	  day.	  Strong	  computational	  descriptions	  are	  
the	  gold	  standard.	  
Unlimited	  PC	  claims	  that	  every	  physical	  system	  performs	  a	  large	  number	  of	  nonequivalent	  
computations.	  This	  claim	  can	  be	  supported	  only	  under	  weak	  computational	  descriptions.	  
Limited	  PC	  claims	  that	  every	  physical	  system	  performs	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  computations	  that	  satisfy	  
some	  condition	  depending	  on	  the	  objective	  properties	  of	  the	  system.	  While	  limited	  PC	  may	  be	  
supported	  under	  robust	  or	  even	  strong	  computational	  descriptions	  for	  systems	  that	  perform	  trivial	  
computations,	  limited	  PC	  has	  not	  been	  established	  for	  any	  nontrivial	  computations.	  Furthermore,	  even	  if	  
limited	  PC	  were	  established	  for	  nontrivial	  computations,	  it	  would	  be	  supported	  at	  best	  by	  robust	  (as	  
opposed	  to	  strong)	  computational	  descriptions.	  
Ontic	  PC	  is	  a	  special	  version	  of	  limited	  PC.	  It	  claims	  that	  every	  physical	  system	  is	  at	  bottom	  just	  a	  
computational	  system.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  every	  physical	  system	  is	  exhausted	  by	  the	  
computation	  it	  performs	  at	  its	  most	  fundamental	  physical	  level.	  Ontic	  PC	  thus	  cannot	  be	  classified	  
according	  to	  scheme	  employed	  in	  this	  work—i.e.	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  computational	  description	  that	  it	  
supports—so	  we	  have	  provided	  a	  separate	  analysis	  elsewhere	  (Piccinini	  and	  Anderson	  2017).	  The	  
underlying	  requirement	  for	  its	  acceptance	  is	  essentially	  acceptance	  that	  two	  systems	  that	  are	  formally	  
or	  observationally	  equivalent	  in	  some	  (though	  not	  all)	  respects	  are	  the	  same.	  Even	  more	  is	  required	  for	  
acceptance	  of	  universal	  ontic	  PC,	  which	  views	  the	  universe	  as	  a	  computer	  simulating	  its	  own	  behavior.	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This	  erases	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  simulator	  and	  its	  simulated	  target	  system,	  requiring	  that	  we	  
accept	  a	  system	  as	  a	  simulation	  of	  itself.	  
Strong	  computational	  descriptions,	  which	  are	  the	  gold	  standard,	  do	  not	  support	  any	  version	  of	  PC	  that	  
we	  considered	  here	  or	  that	  we	  are	  otherwise	  aware.	  
Perhaps	  the	  best	  way	  to	  illustrate	  our	  conclusions	  is	  to	  consider	  what	  it	  might	  mean	  to	  associate	  time	  
evolution	  of	  the	  state	  of	  a	  physical	  system	  with	  performance	  of	  a	  specified	  computation	  f.	  Possible	  
meanings	  include	  “that	  particular	  evolution	  of	  the	  system	  was	  consistent	  with	  having	  computed	  f,”	  “the	  
system’s	  evolution	  will	  always	  objectively	  compute	  f,”	  or	  “the	  system’s	  evolution	  can	  always	  be	  
harnessed	  by	  an	  agent	  to	  perform	  f,”	  where	  computation	  of	  f	  refers	  to	  a	  full	  mapping	  from	  a	  set	  of	  
physical	  input	  (or	  initial)	  states	  to	  physical	  output	  (or	  final)	  states	  that	  has	  a	  structure	  similar	  to	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  function	  f.	  	  	  	  
The	  weak	  computational	  description	  we	  have	  associated	  with	  unlimited	  PC	  would	  sanction	  only	  
something	  like	  this:	  “For	  any	  given	  sequence	  of	  physical	  microstates	  visited	  in	  the	  arbitrary	  time	  
evolution	  of	  any	  sufficiently	  complex	  system	  (e.g.	  a	  rock),	  there	  exists	  an	  assignment	  of	  physical	  
microstates	  to	  computational	  states	  such	  that	  time	  evolution	  of	  the	  microstates	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  
system	  having	  performed	  the	  computation	  f.”	  This	  is	  not	  very	  impressive,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  freedom	  
to	  specify	  computational	  states	  ex	  post	  facto	  and	  without	  constraint,	  and	  is	  certainly	  less	  sensational	  
than	  unlimited	  pancomputationalist	  headlines	  announcing	  that	  rocks	  and	  walls	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  
compute	  everything	  or	  that	  pails	  of	  water	  are	  occasionally	  computationally	  equivalent	  to	  a	  conscious	  
mind.	  	  	  
The	  robust	  computational	  description	  we	  have	  associated	  with	  limited	  PC	  is	  stronger	  than	  this,	  in	  that	  it	  
requires	  regularities	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  physical	  systems	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  state	  that	  –	  for	  computational	  
states	  specified	  ex	  ante	  —	  the	  system	  “always	  objectively	  performs”	  computation	  of	  some	  function	  f.	  	  
For	  trivial	  limited	  PC,	  however,	  f	  is	  too	  simple	  to	  impress;	  the	  recognition	  that	  a	  toaster	  reliably	  
implements	  the	  AND	  function	  is	  unsurprising	  and	  will	  not	  prompt	  Intel	  to	  begin	  building	  computers	  from	  
kitchen	  appliances.	  Even	  the	  trivial	  limited	  PC	  that	  would	  regard	  the	  “universe	  as	  a	  computing	  system”	  is	  
unimpressive,	  since	  it	  corresponds	  to	  a	  single	  trial	  of	  a	  system	  that	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  computing	  an	  
unknown	  f	  for	  one	  and	  only	  one	  input	  (initial	  condition)	  and	  can	  never	  be	  used	  again.	  The	  dearth	  of	  even	  
toy	  examples	  illustrating	  nontrivial	  limited	  PC	  –	  something	  like	  a	  doorstop	  that	  objectively	  performs	  
matrix	  multiplication	  or	  a	  spatula	  with	  the	  capacity	  for	  natural	  language	  processing	  –	  suggests	  that	  
nontrivial	  limited	  PC	  is	  implausible.	  It	  is	  simply	  exceedingly	  unlikely	  that	  systems	  that	  are	  neither	  
designed	  nor	  evolved	  for	  computation	  (like	  iPads	  and	  possibly	  brains)	  will	  possess	  regimented	  structure	  
that	  would	  give	  them	  the	  capacity	  to	  perform	  nontrivial	  computations.	  The	  existence	  of	  particular	  
physical	  systems	  that	  may	  unexpectedly	  possess	  nontrivial	  computational	  capacities	  when	  harnessed	  in	  
specific	  ways,	  such	  as	  those	  studied	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  natural	  and	  unconventional	  computing,	  does	  not	  
help	  the	  pancomputationalist,	  who	  asserts	  that	  all	  physical	  systems	  possess	  computational	  capacities	  
without	  the	  need	  for	  us	  to	  constrain	  or	  harness	  them	  in	  any	  way.	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Finally,	  although	  ontic	  PC	  is	  of	  a	  special	  nature	  that	  frees	  it	  from	  some	  constraints	  used	  to	  analyze	  
unlimited	  and	  non-­‐ontic	  versions	  of	  limited	  PC	  –	  and	  may	  be	  rich	  in	  insights	  when	  throttled	  back	  to	  a	  
more	  metaphorical	  form	  of	  PC	  –	  its	  dramatic	  pronouncements	  lose	  much	  of	  their	  force	  when	  the	  
required	  hypotheses	  or	  redefinitions	  of	  familiar	  terms	  are	  explicitly	  acknowledged.	  A	  claim	  that	  “the	  
universe	  is	  a	  computing	  system”	  is	  not	  particularly	  impressive	  if	  it	  simply	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  freely	  
evolving	  physical	  universe	  qualifies	  as	  a	  computing	  system	  under	  a	  definition	  of	  “computing	  system”	  
that	  admits	  the	  freely	  evolving	  physical	  universe.	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